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Summary 
This report deals with the problem of physical violence in the predominantly Muslim 
regions of the Southern Philippines: parts of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. For the 
past four decades these regions were shaped by a seemingly never-ending armed quest for 
self-determination, which resulted in probably more than 100,000 civilian deaths and 
millions of people who were driven off their land not only once, but several times.  
However, during the past few years and probably for most of the time except for a fair-
ly short time span from the late 1960s to the late 1970s most violent deaths were not the 
result of inter-religious, Christian-Muslim or secessionist fighting, but occurred in the 
context of local practices of conflict management and settlement or dealing with norm or 
rule violations in the context of Islamic or traditional practices. In a nutshell, by and large, 
with the above mentioned exception warfare proved less deadly than everyday practices of 
domination and control. Nevertheless most studies stress the civil war and American or 
Philippine imperialism as crucial features that should be held responsible for the high 
levels of violence in everyday social practices.  
By tracing violent practices back to former centuries, this PRIF-report anchors them 
differently. Whereas it cannot be denied that the secessionist violence and counterinsur-
gency warfare were severe aggravating factors, the roots of violent practices of control and 
domination are found in local history. While this has also been seen by a small number of 
studies that focus on the locally widespread practice of blood-feuding, a top-down prac-
tice of violent control and domination, which will be called status demonstration, has 
escaped scientific attention. 
This report connects the present to the distant past of pre-Islamic social order and 
practices of control and domination and thereby traces the longue durée of current prac-
tices. The most problematic types of violence experienced in these regions all relate to 
efforts at control over either contending forces (horizontal control) or followers and 
would-be-followers (vertical control). As such violence refers to specific local norms, 
structuring social order and appropriate behavior, it should be seen as part of the over-
arching theme of social control and domination.  
It will be shown that current patterns of control violence, while aggravated by the past 
decades of civil-war are not caused by it, but developed out of an ancient system of self-
help. As this was status-based, it vested exclusive rights to employ such violent social con-
trol in the members of the elite status group, who effectively monopolized these types of 
culturally legitimate violence (force). This violence was one crucial but unacknowledged 
cornerstone of an order of “sanctified inequality” which invested one group (the Datus), 
legitimized by descent, with the exclusive right to rule. The report argues that despite 
fundamental changes of the political and economic frames brought about during the past 
centuries, the basic patterns of control survived up to the present.  
After a general introduction, it first gives a succinct overview over the fundamentals of 
pre-Islamic social order, focusing then on mechanisms for dealing with deviance; i.e. vi-
olations of norms or cultural behavioral expectations. Three different arenas and practices 
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are differentiated: the dominant one focusing on mediation, blood-feuding and status-
demonstration. Whereas the first one is largely violence-free, the other two are highly 
violent: blood-feuding and status demonstration, the first being a social practice between 
social equals belonging to the dominant status group, and the second being unilateral 
violence of the dominant against members of the lower status group. In both of these 
practices physical violence is barely limited. Whereas in the feud it can theoretically go on 
forever, the status demonstration can lead to the destruction of the deviant member of the 
lower status group and the enslavement of his relatives, with the decision on the limits of 
violence resting with the aggressor.  
The following part shows how these patterns of control and domination survived Is-
lamization which set in during the 15th century and provided new forms and sources of 
legitimacy for the dominant status groups. However, while the language of social control 
and domination changed to a certain extent, the underlying practices – the non violent 
mediation as well as the highly violent feuding and status demonstration – survived un-
scathed. Connecting social order to the Quran and the Prophet Mohammad even enabled 
the ruling elite to reframe it as sanctified inequality.  
The most intensive analysis is given to the developments from the early 20th century to 
the present. While a comprehensive depiction of development processes is beyond the 
scope of this paper due to constrictions of space, the chapter tries to give enough details to 
illustrate the way in which the traditional elites adapted to the fundamental upheaval 
brought about by colonization through the Americans after 1898, inclusion into the Phi-
lippine Republic in 1946 and the extensive fighting that broke out in the late 1960s and 
led to open and yet unfinished warfare in 1972.  
As in earlier centuries, major forms of violence utilized for purposes of control and 
domination – feuding and status demonstration – emanate from the dominant status 
group. Feuding regulated behavior and competition within the elite-group and by its ex-
clusive character differentiated the elite from the rest of the people. As such it was at the 
same time “a privilege of social rank” and “an instrument of control” (Walter 1969: 12). 
The violent status demonstration effectively showed the ultimately despotic quality of 
domination, when it came to conflict between members of different status groups. It 
could be applied arbitrarily; only limited by considerations of prudence and signaled the 
de facto limitlessness of power and authority.  
The American colonial power, in place since about 1900, let the Moro Datus them-
selves govern their communities to a large extent, only slowly bringing them into the orbit 
of the modern Philippine nation-state. At least since the 1930s this state was no longer an 
American, but a Filipino dominated polity, in which the American colonial power only 
figured as an “overseer”, leaving domestic politics de facto in Filipino hands.  
This American style of state-making, focusing on democracy and the political system 
while neglecting institution building and administrative resilience enabled the local elites 
to capture the state and transform the administration into a tool for their own, uncon-
trolled domination. It is of no real importance whether these politicians are described as 
strongmen, bosses, or, on account of their familial bases, as members of political families 
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or dynasties. The patterns are neo-patrimonial, based on patron-client relations and rent-
seeking, undergirded by the threat or actual use of physical violence. In many ways Filipi-
no politicians were and still are quite similar to the Muslim Datus described in this report: 
both exercise “monopolistic personal control over coercive and economic resources in 
their territorial jurisdictions or bailiwicks” (Sidel 1999: 141).  
Muslim elites, having to contend with these Filipino politicians, were able to capture a 
place for themselves in the national system of patronage, in effect dealing votes and loyal-
ty against total freedom with respect to local governance and domination. The local style 
of domination suited the national politicians’ interests. It provided secure vote-banks. In 
exchange Filipino politicians never asked any questions, nor protested or took any action.  
Eventually, since the 1950s local violence-based patterns of social control and domina-
tion slowly spilled out of control. The violence-free non-state mediatory systems, that are 
focused on the local elites weakened with the increasing transformation of traditional 
leaders into modern politicians and the spread of modern weaponry, exacerbating com-
petition. Lines of conflict multiplied, and violence became an even more frequently used 
feature of conflict management.  
The state did not counter this development, through which might became right, as na-
tional elites were not critical of local repression and violent rule as long as the votes were 
forthcoming. In addition, while some of the patterns and culturalist vindication of vi-
olence are different from other regions of the Philippines, both feuding and status-
demonstration can be found in different guises in other regions, too. Here as there, they 
are indispensable foundations of local domination and control.  
On the local level the old ideology of sanctified inequality proved very helpful, as it 
provided a culturalist cloak to patterns of domination and repression, a cloak that ta-
booed any contestation of the local rules of the game. As control-violence is at the same 
time part and parcel of local regimes of self-help, it enjoyed and still enjoys wide accep-
tance, even though the destructive consequences are regularly deplored.  
The civil-war arena certainly had its share in aggravating the various pre-existent 
problems of violence. The national political system also provided a crucial backdrop for 
the continued employment of violent social control and domination with its vast options 
for local strongmen to trade loyalty to national politicians expressed in votes against wea-
ponry, financial resources, a free hand in the private use of police and militias as “private 
armies”, and a general turning of a blind eye to all sorts of illegal practices,.  
Nevertheless, given the vagaries of the peace process between the local guerilla, the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Philippine state and the seemingly unre-
formability of Philippine politics, one crucial first step for tackling the problem of social 
control violence in the Muslim regions, would be to acknowledge its local history and 
analyze the cultural dynamics, that make it in principle still highly legitimate, despite 
many grievances. This could bring about a deconstruction, laying open the patterns of 
despotic or arbitrary domination. On this basis Moros could reformulate their own na-
tional history. Like any history invented and constructed to serve the needs of building a 
nation where there was none before, this history still portrays the own past in fairly glo-
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rious term. It thereby stands in the way of a critical reevaluation that could provide a cru-
cial first stepping stone for constructing a viable path towards reform.  
While studies like the one done by Human Rights Watch in 2010, exposing the violent 
and despotic regime of the Ampatuan Clan are highly laudable, true change will only be 
possible, when such studies are done by locals, when Muslim researchers turn to their 
own society to expose its short-comings and defects and from there devise paths for a 
better future.  
The report addresses issues pointed out by the Geneva and Oslo declarations on armed 
violence, which stress the people’s right to security as well as the nexus between security 
and development. It especially stresses the right of the people to live free from fear, point-
ing to triggers of fear that do not lie in civil wars or simple crime, but in fairly well estab-
lished practices of violent social control and domination emanating from the establish-
ment. Whereas the two declarations are rather shy about naming either governments or 
established elites as perpetrators or instigators of violence, this report argues, that any 
strategy aiming at a peaceful society geared towards better chances for development has 
not only to take into account violence emanating from conflicts between governments 
and guerrilla movements or criminal gangs and syndicates, but also violence perpetrated 
by representatives of the establishment in order to safeguard continued control and do-
mination. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early 1970s the area of Muslim Mindanao, comprising some of the western parts 
of Mindanao and the islands of the Sulu Archipelago in the Southern Philippines, has 
been engulfed in continued military confrontation between local insurgent groups, first 
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and later the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) and the Philippine state. At issue is the right to self-determination, meaning inde-
pendence or autonomy, when seen from the insurgent groups, or the sovereignty of the 
Philippines and the limits to self-governance when seen from the Philippine state. From 
an official Philippine point of view the Moros, a collective name invented by the Spanish 
colonial power for all Muslims in the Southern Philippines, are simply Filipinos adhering 
to the Muslim faith. Mohagher Iqbal, chief negotiator of the MILF, presents the main-
stream Moro understanding of their history:  
“Mindanao has always been in itself, a separate and independent entity from Luzon and the Vi-
sayas, even before the Spaniards came in 1521. Spain never really conquered the Moros for more 
than 300 years. When the Americans came in 1898, they did not only sign peace treaties with our 
forebears, but also created the Moro Province (Cotabato, Davao, Zamboanga, Lanao, and Sulu) 
in 1903 to administer the Moro affairs separately from Luzon and Visayas. [...] We opposed the 
inclusion of our homeland in the grant of independence in 1946, but the Americans did not lis-
ten to our pleadings. They saw the Philippines governed by Filipinos as serving their imperialist 
agenda. Under Filipino hegemony, Moro state of affairs continues to deteriorate. They continue 
to lose their lands; they lagged behind in almost all aspects of life. [...] But alas! Even with this lit-
tle space remaining in their hands, the power of the status quo is too powerful in conceding this 
to us, so that we can chart the destiny of our people free from the dictates of the political class in 
Manila” (Iqbal 2011). 
Map of Muslim Mindanao in the Philippines 
 
The dominance of the violent political contestation between two armed groups fighting 
for self-determination and the state since the early 1970s has led to a rather narrow focus 
of the literature on this region, most of it being on the history of the secessionist war.  
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Researchers tend to forget or overlook that violence in this region was not restricted to 
the civil-war arena alone, but pervaded everyday political and civil life as well. The past 
few years then brought a small second current of literature on the rather high levels of 
local violence, which have only a spurious connection to the macro-political conflict or 
are not connected to it at all (see e.g.: Kreuzer 2005; Torres 2007; Ugarte 2008; HRW 
2010). Kreuzer (2005) focused on the relevance of microdynamics of violence for the ex-
planation of the macrodynamics of the civil-war arena, the studies in the book edited by 
Torres (2007) analyzed in detail the current dynamics of blood-feuding, Ugarte (2008) 
discussed the interplay of politics and crime in the local kidnapping industry and the 
HRW report (2010) detailed the violent practices of one specific clan. These studies are 
united by a common observation: that there is a foundation to such violence, which is 
independent from the civil war and that this foundation can in a broad sense be deemed 
to be “traditional”: meaning that violence evolved out of and was based on various social 
practices, that can be traced historically and still carry a certain amount of traditional 
legitimacy amongst local populace and leaders alike. Other practices seem to have 
emerged out of the amalgamation of traditional practices, the modern state, and demo-
cratic governance giving rise to hybrid forms, which marginalize the violence-inhibiting 
aspects of both the traditional and the modern orders, while amplifying and de-limiting 
the violent aspects of both.  
Despite these observations, the fundamental assumption, whereupon such violence 
should be understood in the context of a civil-war induced culture of violence, still pre-
dominates in discussions on the local level. Such a perspective directly connects the solu-
tion to local problems of violence to a successful peace agreement. If, however, the macro-
level conflict between the secessionist groups and the state is only an aggravating, but no 
causal factor for the high levels of violence, that pervade local political competition and 
conflict resolution practices, then a peace agreement may have hardly any impact on the 
problem at all.  
This report takes the above mentioned observation with respect to the traditional 
foundations of current violence serious and aims at tracing the historical paths, which led 
to the rather deplorable current situation.1 It assumes that a significant amount of vi-
olence is perpetrated in order to safeguard or establish control over a locality and its pop-
ulation. It is generally perpetrated by establishment forces to determine and enforce an 
order most beneficial to themselves. As such, it can be likened to a coin with two sides: 
one side is the enforcement of a social order, the other the upholding of domination en-
grained in this social order. This does not mean that there is only one homogeneous es-
tablishment. Quite to the contrary; fractures within the establishment may lead to com-
peting efforts to maintain or assert specific readings of the social order. This in turn takes 
place in the context of political competition. Counter-elites may also try to establish and 
enforce their preferred type of order which typically would mean a realignment of the 
 
 
1 This PRIF-report is a partially restructured version of a German language HSKF-Report (Kreuzer 2011).  
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system of domination. Irrespective of actor, the violence employed in such a context can 
be categorized as social control violence.  
Social control, put broadly, has been said to be about “the handling of right and 
wrong” (Black 1998: xxiii). More precisely, social control can be defined as:  
„all social (and technical) arrangements, mechanisms, norms, belief systems, positive and nega-
tive sanctions that either aim at and/or result in the prevention of undesired behavior or, if this 
has already occurred, respond to the undesired act in a way that tries to prevent its occurrence in 
the future“ (Scheerer/Hess 1997: 103f). 
This definition makes clear, that social control normally forgoes physical violence. 
And while it is generally a prerogative of the status quo powers in a given society, it has to 
be emphasized that the status quo is always contested. Social control, in the words of Joel 
Migdal is “the currency for which social organizations compete” (Migdal 2001: 51). While 
fairly rare physical violence nevertheless is ultimately the iron fist in the velvet glove of the 
multitude of other mechanisms that aim at upholding a specific social order.  
Whereas social control is a broad concept and hard to operationalize, violent social 
control is a much more curtailed one and will be the focus of this text, which largely fo-
cuses on social control violence in defense of the status quo. It is about establishment 
players, who apply violence in order to force opponents of a roughly equal standing or 
subordinates to obey some sets of rules on appropriate behavior and the order constituted 
by them.  
In Muslim Mindanao critical violations of local norms and rules are mostly conceived 
of as conflicts between two or more parties and only seldom as breaches of a public order. 
Even theft, insult or murder are generally not so much understood as a violation of a pub-
lic good/norm. Instead, they establish a conflict between private parties. Norm enforce-
ment is dependent on the claim of the victim and it is accomplished in ways that streng-
then exactly this understanding of a particularistic private good that does not so much 
relate to an abstract universal order, but to a specific dyadic relationship between victim 
and perpetrator. Consequently, the parties to the conflict generally are the masters of the 
proceedings. Their acceptance (or non-acceptance) is of supreme importance. Three 
forms of social control predominate: mediation, blood-feuding and status demonstration, 
the first being trilateral, the second bilateral and the third unilateral.  
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Adjudication, with a judge imposing a judgment, is rare, mediation being the rule, a prac-
tice which in effect results in a violence-free resolution of all conflicts which are dealt with 
in this way. Mediation basically knows no penalization, but only fines that are intended to 
compensate the victim for its loss and rituals reestablishing community harmony.  
However, there always existed the practice of blood-feuding, which in conflicts 
amongst members of higher status groups not seldom took and still takes precedence over 
mediation, and therefore can be characterized as a predominantly upper-class phenome-
non of horizontal violence exerted amongst (near) equals. Theoretically blood-feuds can 
continue indefinitely. In practice, however, most are settled through mediatory processes 
after the mutual killing has gone its way.  
Besides this, a second practice of violent social control, the status demonstration, is ex-
erted top-down. It differs from the feud by its direction and the fact, that it is unilateral, 
i.e. there is no logic of revenge. Violence is unilaterally directed at members of lower sta-
tus groups in order to symbolically underline the unconditional dominance of the elite. 
Therefore status demonstration qualifies as a form of violence that closely resembles ter-
ror, specifically state terror, even though, it is not perpetrated by the state, but by mem-
bers of the elite class and their henchmen, who for the past century generally doubled as 
leaders of political or administrative state institutions on the local level. It may therefore 
be called establishment-terror(ism). These different forms of violence all share one aim, 
upholding social control and a hierarchical order by preventing or punishing norm/rule 
violations.  
While this report focuses on the Moros this is not to delimit the problem of violent 
control to them in the context of the Philippines. Quite to the contrary; while a number of 
cultural patterns may be specific and different from those in other regions of the Philip-
pines, the phenomena as such can be found elsewhere. Feuding violence in the form of 
the political feud pertains in many regions of the Philippines, leading to a large number of 
officeholders getting killed by hired gunmen. In addition there is a large number journal-
ists, judges and prosecutors, not to mention the many dead political activists, who die 
through extra-legal executions, a form of “dispute resolution” that is likewise used to deal 
with criminals. Hardly any of such cases is ever solved and brought to court. However, it 
seems quite certain to assume that many of the perpetrators belong either to the armed 
forces, the police or are gunmen, hired by local politicians. Despite a number of similari-
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ties, there are also significant differences between the logic and frequency of violent con-
trol between regions. Therefore it seems prudent to take an inductive “bottom-up” ap-
proach, as “a behavior identical with respect to its outward process and outcome can rest 
upon highly different constellations of motives, the most intelligible and evident of which 
need not have really been in play” (Weber 1988: 428; translation P.K.).  
While violence employed by establishment forces may be a problem in many regions 
of the Philippines and probably the Philippine polity as such, the underlying logic perpe-
tuating the practices emerges to a significant extent out of local traditions, beliefs, struc-
tures and established social practices. Insofar, this study may be read as a first opening of 
a field of research that aims at understanding and explaining the differences and commo-
nalities of violent practices of social control in various regions of the Philippines.  
On a general level this report argues that in the Muslim populated regions (as in many 
other regions of the Philippines) two prerequisites of a state-focused system of coercive 
social control are lacking: firstly on a factual level the state has no monopoly on the means 
of force (“legitimate violence”), and secondly on a normative level significant segments of 
local society reserve to themselves the right to employ physical violence in either prevent-
ing or penalizing behavior they deem to be deviant.  
Most of the current violence in the Moro regions should not be understood as a spi-
noff of the four decades of civil war, even if the war certainly aggravated the practice. Cur-
rent practices rather developed out of a) local traditional practices, which can be traced to 
the pre-Islamic past, partially reframed by several centuries of Islamic dogma and practice 
and b) the amalgamation of these practices and traditions with the new frame of the mod-
ern nation-state in its colonial as well as post-colonial guise.  
This approach to framing much of the ongoing violence in Muslim Mindanao puts in-
to doubt visions of a peaceful development for the region once the Moro-conflict is re-
solved. If the analysis holds, the much more probable future for Muslim Mindanao is that 
of a highly repressive clan-based order in which social control and political domination 
are routinely upheld (and challenged) by violent means.  
Theoretically this report challenges the widely held assumption that violent acts gener-
ally are mere departures from peace-oriented cultural norms and everyday domination in 
stable systems, which is upheld by the consent of the ruled. Instead, it shows, that in the 
form of status-demonstration the local traditional system of domination included a prac-
tice that closely resembled state-terrorism, meaning a strategy by or a behavior of estab-
lishment forces that cow the population at large into submission by employing partly 
targeted and partly indiscriminate violence against some of its members thereby creating 
a culture of fear and a feeling of terror.  
It will be shown that a part of the paternalistic self-image of the Datu-class as well as 
the corresponding description of a just order in which conflicts are settled amicably under 
the benevolent leadership of the Datus is a highly successful ideology that enables the 
ruling class to maximize their interests and profits at the cost of the ordinary people.  
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The analysis is differentiated into three broad sections, the first focusing on the major 
characteristics of pre-Islamic social order and the accompanying patterns of social con-
trol, the second on the changes brought about by Islamization up to the final years of self-
determined development at the end of the 19th century while the third turns towards the 
developments in the wake of the integration of the Muslim societies into a modern state, 
with an emphasis on the last decades.  
2. Pre-Islamic Social Order and Social Control 
2.1 A regulated Anarchy of Barangays 
There are no original sources on the pre-Islamic Philippines that allow us to reconstruct 
the actual practices by which social order was upheld. Likewise, there are hardly any 
sources on the Muslim regions during the first centuries after Islamisation, i.e. the 15th to 
the 18th century except for the genealogies (tarsila) of the ruling families, which, however, 
give no significant information on social order or community life. Whatever is known 
and presented in the short sketch below is culled from observations of early European 
visitors and Spanish friars, who settled on various islands of the Philippines during the 
first centuries of Spanish colonialism. Despite this sorry state of affairs a few general pat-
terns can be discerned.  
The basic and only enduring unit of political organization was the barangay (village, 
settlement). With a few exceptions there seems to have been no durable super- and sub-
ordination between barangays. The size of a Barangay normally did not exceed several 
hundred people.  
Inter-Barangay relations seem to have been characterized by mistrust, hostility and 
raiding exhibitions (Phelan 1959: 16: 22). Pedro Chirino noted in 1604:  
„[a]t no time did the Filipinos have any form of towns with civic order and political government, 
such that at least one island, or a number of villages, recognizing one person as their lord, might 
live under his protection and rule; but he who was most powerful conquered others, and ruled 
over them. As there was not only one such, but almost all the chiefs asserted their authority, and 
conquered and ruled, the general result was that each chief remained apart from the rest, having 
his own followers, and fortified himself, keeping up an attitude of defense. Consequently, they 
were usually at war with one another“ (Chirino 1604, in: Blair/Robertson 1903-1909, vol. 13: 25-
26; see also Colin 1663, in: Blair/Robertson 1903-1909, vol. 40: 82-84). 
Chiefly power was direct only on the level of the Barangay. Beyond that, we get, as 
Junker argues, “a strong impression of almost continually shifting power centers as al-
liance networks were realigned through various chiefly competitive strategies aimed at 
attracting and holding followers” (Junker 1999: 374). Philippine society therefore qualifies 
as segmentary, following a strong heterarchical principle of social organization, meaning 
a predominance of horizontal differentiation of like-structured units (White 1995; Sigrist 
1979). With respect to social control a segmentary setting implies a multitude of similar 
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units, each of which claims the same status and the whole panoply of “rights”, amongst 
them the right to prevent or penalize deviance. In such settings political and social order 
are constructed from below, coalescing into a system, that may be characterized as “regu-
lated anarchy” (Sigrist 1979).2 
Despite a number of regional variations, local order seems to have been stratified into 
three broad groups, two of which may be further differentiated: 1) a ruling class legiti-
mated genealogically, 2) a class of freemen, and 3) a class of dependents, whose status 
resembled in some respects slavery, hence the Spanish called them by this name. The rul-
ing class can be divided into the Datu and the maharlika, the first denoting at the very 
same time the ruler himself and the social group out of which the rulers were chosen 
(Scott 1994: 128). The “slaves” at the bottom of social hierarchy were divided into two 
categories; whereas the first fairly closely resemble indentured servants and derive from 
the own local society, the second, which much more resemble the notions that go with 
slavery, were captured during raiding ventures. 
As neither sexual relations nor marriage were completely restricted to partners within 
one’s own class, the three- or fivefold division of local society actually masks a complex 
mix characterized by hybridity. While theoretically membership of the dominant classes 
was by descent only, in social practice there seems to have been a significant amount of 
individual and inter-generational mobility (Aguilar 1998; Mintz, 2006; Junker 1999; Pla-
sencia 1589, in: Blair/Robertson 1903-1909, vol. 16: 181-182). In addition, even though a 
Datu’s authority arose from lineage, there were nevertheless a number of options for en-
terprising contenders to secure top positions through displays of physical prowess (Scott 
1994: 129). Francisco Colin in the 17th century provides a critical reading of contempo-
rary practices of leadership succession:  
“[...] by robbery and tyranny, which was the most usual method—in that way he gains authority 
and reputation, and increases it the more he practices tyranny and violence. With these begin-
nings, he takes the name of dato; and others, whether his relatives or not, come to him, and add 
credit and esteem to him, and make him a leader. Thus there is no superior who gives him au-
thority or title, beyond his own efforts and power” (Colin 1663, in: Blair/Robertson 1903-1909, 
vol. 40: 86-87). 
 
 
 
2  I prefer to avoid the concept of segmentary state, as it in my view overstretches the concept of the state, 
preferring instead to speak of a segmentary society and polity. The term of segmentary state, if used at all, 
ought to be reserved to the Muslim Regions after the introduction of the Sultanate, as the latter provided 
the first enduring superior set of political, social and religious order, that to a certain extent fits the model, 
according to which a segmentary state is “one in which there is a central kingship and many peripheral 
rulers. Political sovereignty is only exercised by the king within the central domain [...] and is also exer-
cised autonomously by each peripheral ruler in his own domain. The sometimes minuscule kingships of 
the peripheral domains are replicas of the central kingship writ small” (Southall 1988: 64-65).  
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2.2 The Role of Physical Violence in Social Control 
In pre-colonial Mindanao as in the rest of the Philippines there were three fairly indepen-
dent mechanisms, which were available for resolving conflicts that resulted from rule 
violation. These were firstly mediation, arbitration and adjudication, secondly blood-
feuding and thirdly unilateral status demonstration. 
Most conflicts were settled in the context of the first system of conflict-resolution, and, 
even though a number of rule violations mandated some form of corporal punishments, 
these were regularly replaced by fines, so that it is no exaggeration to argue that monetary 
fines were the mainstay of social control (Scott 1984: 133).  
Fining actually worked as a mechanism that stabilized the dominance of the ruling 
strata as penalties against members of lower status groups were harsher than those against 
members of the elite.3 Further, the position of judge or mediator was reserved to the rul-
ing strata, who in this position shared in the fines. Finally those of higher status were in 
an advantageous position, as in many cases, the number of witnesses proved decisive, a 
practice that provided incentives for witnesses to take the stronger side. Taken together, 
the system of control through fining resulted in a perpetual reallocation of material 
wealth in favor of the dominant groups and produced an underclass of indentured ser-
vants, a status that was hereditary (Phelan 1959; Junker 1999; Mintz 2006; Plasencia 1589, 
in: Blair/Robertson 1903-1909, vol. 7+16; Scott 1994: 130). Corporal punishment seems to 
have been rare and largely directed against people of lower status, the most important 
form being flogging (Mintz 2006: 30-31; Scott 1994: 139). The only exceptions to this rule 
were witchcraft and sorcery which carried the death penalty (Scott 1994: 139).The fun-
damental principle within this system was not “to each the same” but “to each his own”, a 
principle that actively worked in the favor of those who were already of higher status. 
However, the system did not apply to all kinds of rule violations or conflicts. It was 
used for conflicts amongst freemen, and between nobility/Datus and freemen, however, it 
was not applicable to conflicts between Datus. These had to be settled in the context of a 
blood-feud, which included mediation and probably also arbitration, where however, 
violence was given ample space as a means for reacting to a perceived rule violation, 
hence as a means for social control. Mediation after the initial norm violation clearly 
seems to have been the exception to the rule of violent self-defense. Normally, only after 
violence had had its way, could mediation set in. Insofar as intra-elite conflict was only 
secondarily managed within the fold of the regular mediatory-to-adjudicatory system, the 
elite was not only privileged within the law, but actually above the law administered and 
controlled by it. Social control within the ruling strata can by and large be equated with 
 
 
3  The example of killing might illustrate this asymmetry. In the case of a freeman killing a Datu or a mem-
ber of a Datu-family, most probably the freeman, his wife and children would be killed, his property 
seized. If, however, a freeman was killed by a member of the ruling status groups, the latter normally was 
fined only (Mintz 2006: 28-29).  
Violence as a means of control and domination in the Southern Philippines 9
 
 
blood-feuding, a practice which seems to have been confined to this class only. This 
makes blood-feuding a horizontal, exclusive type of violence amongst equals, through 
which the superior status group dissociated itself from the rest of society and exercised its 
prerogative of legitimate violence. The killing of a chief almost inevitably meant inter-
village warfare. When some semblance of balance was reached (and only then) could the 
second stage of the feud set in: the mediation by chiefs of other neighboring barangays, 
who would collectively decide on the blood-money that would have to be paid.  
The dynamics of the Feud 
 
An interesting aspect of the feuding system is that all violent actions, except for the initial 
norm violation are at the same time acts of social control, i.e. violent reactions to a norm 
violation and thereby expected and norm-adequate behavior. However, at the same time 
they are defined as norm violations that require a further act of (violent) social control. By 
definition then the feud is not able to settle a conflict except for the case when one party is 
exterminated by the other. In all other cases at one point in time this dimension of social 
control has to be surmounted and mediation obtains its place as the core means of con-
flict resolution, thereby finally balancing the negative compensation inherent in the feud-
ing practice. Whereas mediation compensates a victim for a loss by providing an appro-
priate compensation (positive compensation), the feud tries to inflict a similar loss on the 
side of the perpetrator (negative compensation). It is important to understand, that nei-
ther is conceived of as punishment. Punishment is restricted to the rather small number 
of cases that are adjudicated and to the violent retributive practice of status demonstra-
tion described below. 
Side by side with the blood feud there seems to have existed a traditional expression of 
vertical social control, whereby the powerful simply killed or enslaved those without pow-
er and status in retaliation against a severe act of deviance. Plasencia reports that in such 
cases (as the murder of a Datu or a member of his family by a freeman), we find unilateral 
and extraordinarily violent self-help by-passing the standard-mechanism of mediation: 
the perpetrator (and sometimes his immediate relatives) was simply killed, further family-
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members were enslaved and their possessions seized (see also Scott 1994: 139). This type 
of social control violence neither depended on a foregoing judicial decision, nor resulted 
in a blood-feud. It seems to have functioned like an ultimate demonstration of status and 
power through which the core of the authority relationship and social order were symbo-
lized in an act of physical destruction and can therefore probably best be characterized as 
a status-demonstration.  
In certain respects, status demonstrations closely resemble modern practices of estab-
lishment violence (Rosenbaum/Sederberg 1974) or state(-sponsored) terror against civi-
lians insofar as they try to assure norm abidance of a vast audience by intimidating it 
through selected acts of violence. It stands to reason that violence exerted in the form of a 
status demonstration sent a very strong signal to all other freemen to strictly comply with 
the rules established by the dominant elite. And it can be assumed that the audience cer-
tainly understood this message. This wider aspect of control need not have been inten-
tional, the individual Datu, who killed a disobedient freeman and enslaved his family, 
need not have had the intention to send a signal to all other freemen, yet, it is hardly im-
aginable that the action did not have exactly this effect.  
Mechanisms of social control in the pre-colonial and pre-Islamic Philippines  
 Mediation/Arbitration/
Adjudication Blood-Feud Status demonstration 
Parties involved trilateral bilateral unilateral 
Area of application 
(mostly) control of de-
viant behavior of mem-
bers of lower status group 
serious conflicts be-
tween members of the 
dominant status groups 
reaction to massive rule 
violation by members of 
lower status groups 
Direction of control vertical horizontal vertical 
Agents of control ruling status group ruling status group ruling status group 
Intent of control compensation and resto-ration of order 
protection against loss 
of status 
demonstration of status 
and power 
Principle of justice to each his own to each the same to each his own 
Level of physical 
violence low extremely high extremely high 
Forms of violence corporal punishment killing killing, enslavement 
The above sketched status demonstration obviously is not state terror in the strict sense, 
as a state or something akin to a state was non-existent in pre-colonial Philippines. In our 
context, it was violence employed by the dominant status group, the establishment itself, 
in order to control the lower status groups. The context, akin to establishment violence 
and state-terror was one of “illegality” or legal ambiguity. Despite being an established 
social practice, there are no indications, that this type of violence was in one way or 
another derived from or sanctioned by customary law. The two probably coexisted side by 
side, meaning that the traditional systems of mediation and adjudication were abrogated 
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in certain instances. Whereas in the cases of the blood-feud this abrogation was regulated 
and eventually customary mediation mechanisms were brought back into operation, the 
abrogation was permanent in the case of the status demonstration. This violence can fur-
ther be classified as terror, a categorization that refers primarily to the presumable effect 
of such acts on the relevant audience: the community members belonging to lower status 
groups at large. Thereby this type of violence satisfies the probably most crucial criterion 
of the term terror – that the violent activity conveys a message of threat and intimidation 
to a group of people much larger than the number of victims.4  
3. Social Order and Social Control in Muslim-Mindanao 
up to the early 20th century 
3.1 Anarchical competition within an order of sanctified inequality 
Islamization of the future Muslim regions on Mindanao and the Sulu-Archipelago began 
in the 15th century, commencing in the Sulu-Archipelago, mostly settled by the Tausug 
and the areas around the mouth of the Rio Grande de Mindanao, settled mostly by Ma-
guindanao. Later Islamization progressed northward to the areas around the lake Lanao, 
settled by the Maranao. Whereas in the first two regions, the coming of Islam was coequal 
with the establishment of single Sultanates, the Maranao areas continued their traditional 
organization, various traditional leaders taking on the title of Sultan, to enhance and sancti-
fy their dominant position. Despite the introduction of the Sultanates, political power and 
authority mostly stayed with the Datus. On a practical level, political organization hardly 
ever surpassed the level of the inged, or village. It is on this level that “political institutions, 
inheritable titles [...], the fixed association of particular lines of descent [...] and differentia-
tion between the various ranks of descent lines are manifested” (Baradas 1973: 275).  
Despite Islamization all three regions remained segmentary polities in that they 
“lacked a territorially fixed corporate group under the absolute tutelage of a political lead-
er with true coercive power over his subjects” (Junker 1999: 68). Even in Sulu, the Sultan 
had no  
“formal political authority which does not have its counterpart on the local level. [...] The sultan 
can be viewed as an extremely powerful headman, while the local headman might be viewed as a 
petty sultan in his own domain. The differences between them are not in types of authority 
available to them, but rather in the extent and range of that authority. In order to enforce deci-
sions, the sultan has to depend on the extent and range of his alliance network. [...] raw power or 
 
 
4  For definitions of terror and terrorism see for example Claridge 1996; Jackson 2008; Ruby 2002; Schmidt 
2004; Schmidt 2011.  
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force (the capacity to use violence for legitimate ends) moves upward [...]. Central and peripher-
al authorities are mirror images of each other; both have the same rights and obligations vis-à-
vis the political system” (Kiefer 1972: 109).  
The low level of integration is possibly best illustrated by the Muslims’ resistance to 
Spanish rule, which despite the high level of formal integration via the Sultanates was at 
no point in time put up in a coordinated or joint manner (Federspiel 1998: 347). Whereas 
at times Sultans actually seemed to have had some degree of authority over the territories 
proclaimed to be under their rule, for most of the time, the Sultans should be seen as Da-
tus amongst Datus, whose influence depended on their capacity in building alliances (Kie-
fer 1967: 24; Loyre 1991: 23).5 
Four hundred years after Pedro Chirino’s characterization of the regulated anarchical 
practice of traditional Philippine inter-barangay relations cited above, an American ob-
server on Moro governance, gave a strikingly similar account of contemporary conditions 
at the beginning of the 20th century: 
„The Moros [...] have no general form of government, are broken up and divided into number-
less tribes and clans, each ruled by a Sultan or Datto [sic]. These petty chiefs are practically inde-
pendent of any superior control and are powerful in proportion to their following and their 
weapons of war. They make peace and alliances with each other; fall out and quarrel whenever 
any disagreement springs up; wage war on each other, and are generally in a state of perpetual 
fear and distrust of neighbors; [...] every Datto and Sultan is a law unto himself and has the pow-
er of life and death over his followers. No war lords are paramount” (Davis 1903, Appendix II: 
28+36). 
This semi-anarchical state of affairs should not be mistaken for a retraction of the he-
reditary claim to leadership. To the contrary, by claiming descent from Mohammad the 
traditional legitimation was even sanctified (McKenna 1998: 66). Consequently, genealo-
gies (tarsila) became crucial means for upholding or acquiring the right to datuship. 
Through the tarsilas “proofs par excellence of legitimacy not only for a family or elite to 
rule a people but also for them to serve as religious leaders of the community” was ascer-
tained (Majul 1973: 3). In addition, the tarsilas established the right of these leading fami-
lies to territory. This was based on the fiction, that the first Muslim ruler married “a local 
girl, preferably a princess belonging to the older aristocracy” (Majul 1973: 5). Thereby 
traditional rights to rule and the new Islamic ones were merged into a hybrid order, 
which might likewise be characterized as an enculturated, localized Islamic order or an 
Islamized local culture. As descent was not only traced to some famous ancestors or legi-
timated through purportedly aristocratic bloodlines, but to the progenitor of the Sultanate 
and thereby to the Prophet itself, this order became sanctified and undisputable. 
 
 
5  Captain Wilke, who visited Sulu in the 1840s, reported that “such is the absence of legal restraint, that all 
find it necessary to go abroad armed and accompanied by a trusty set of followers, who are also armed. 
[...] according to the Datu’s account, frequent affrays take place in the open streets, which not unfre-
quently end in bloodshed. Caution is never laid aside, the only law that exists being that of force [...]” 
(Wilke 1842, in: Blair/Robertson 1903-1909, vol. 43: 166). 
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This local ideology of sanctified inequality was presented to the new American admin-
istration by two powerful Tausug Datus, who argued in 1901 that “nobody should be al-
lowed to interfere with the administration of the country who is not fit for it, not being a 
chief by heredity, as others than those do not know their own rascality” (Datus Calbi and 
Joakanain 1901, in: MacArthur 1901, Appendix P: 42).  
However, in practice leadership positions were highly contested and genealogical legi-
timation could rather easily be construed in an order where a large array of persons could 
claim royal blood. So in effect, “the personal attributes of a datu, especially his ability to 
command fear and deference, remained a key factor to his political success” (McKenna 
1998: 57).6 Likewise the belief in the necessity of a genealogical legitimation of claims to 
dominance is still firmly anchored in the elite and the population alike. The endurance of 
both of these characteristics will be illustrated below. 
3.2 Adat in an Islamic guise 
Islamization had a significant impact on traditional practices of social control. However, 
as tradition and Islamic faith by and large harmonized quite well, these were in effect 
much more of a rhetorical quality, than any changes in substance. The limits of actual 
Islamization become obvious in the observations of contemporary observers. Comment-
ing on Maguindanao before the rise of the numbers of Hajis, a Christian priest com-
mented, that “Islam, or more accurately its clergy [...] used to be pretty nearly extinct. 
Wherever they were [...] they were guided by ancient customs, and their number had 
greatly diminished” (Father March in Ileto 2007: 70). For the late 19th century Pablo Ca-
valleria reports of Basilan: 
“They are not very observant in their ceremonies. They omit many of the rules of their false 
prophet Mahomet, add others which are not prescribed, and observe some, but in the time and 
manner that appears best to them. For example, they do not pray even at least once a day, almost 
never observe Friday, and it is never seen that any of them has gone to Meca [...]. On a certain 
occasion several chiefs and imams gathered together; and when speaking of Adam and Eve, they 
did not succeed in telling who were their parents, and they had recourse to the missionary in or-
der that he might instruct them on that point. They do not know either, the day on which their 
Mahomet was born, or much less any of his history” (Cavalleria 1886, in: Blair/Robertson, vol. 
43: 256f, 263). 
The 15th to the late 19th century saw a hybridization of two different legal systems, Is-
lamic law (sara agama) and traditional law (sara adat) as well as its partial codification 
(see Saleeby 1976). The fundamental principle of “each according to his own” was upheld, 
likewise the focus on minimizing corporal punishment in favor of fining did not change. 
In effect, it may be argued, that for all practical reasons, the pre-Islamic practices by and 
 
 
6  For the role of these qualities in the late 20th centuries see: Salazar (1995: 56). 
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large stayed intact, as long as they could be defined as being in accordance with the basic 
precepts of Islam. 
Saleeby, commenting on local practice, pointed out, that  
“The Moros are not strict nor just in the execution of the law. The laws relating to murder, adul-
tery, and inheritance are seldom strictly complied with. Indeed, the laws of inheritance as given 
in the Luwaran are generally disregarded and are seldom considered at all” (Saleeby 1976: 70). 
In practice sara agama, while normatively superior, was less important than sara adat 
with respect to actual conflict resolution and social control. The Maranao for example exhi-
bit two different strands of traditional authority: the Agama, based on the mosque, and the 
totonganaya, a kinship organization which has “an autonomous area of authority over its 
own members” (Sumaguina 1988: 24). This latter system and not the mosque-based Agama 
has “the most effective control, power and influence over the villagers and to which the 
villagers give strongest attachment, loyalty, obedience, and support (Sumaguina 1988: 37). 
Even though the Agama community is denoted by its Islamic markers, the order constituted 
by it rests on the “Maranao indigenous system of law, beliefs, and values, e.g. the taritib, 
adat law and maratabat (descent, customs and status; P.K.)” (Sumaguina 1988: 44). In both 
types of authority structure tradition clearly outweighs religion. 
How far cultural adaptation could go can be illustrated by the example of incest, which 
was to be penalized by death. For the Tausug this meant that the culprits were put into a 
bamboo cage and drowned in the sea. In practice, however, only their clothings were 
drowned: “This allows their dusa (sin) to melt altogether in the ocean floor. To culminate 
the symbolic drowning, an animal sacrifice known as pag-sugsug-tawbat (ritual of repen-
tance) is offered” (Jundam 2006: 34).7 Flogging should be performed by a strong member 
of the group with all of his strength. Hadji Jundam reports that „In practice, however, the 
violators are flogged symbolically for 100 times with rattan in a secluded room. An aged 
Imam performs the flogging with the least strength he can“ (Jundam 2006: 46).  
It is also important to note that such formal adjudication was the exception to the rule of 
mediation. Only a small number of delicts were understood as public delicts, offenses 
against god or the community, and as such dealt with by legal authority “and only in these 
cases is punishment applied impersonally, by persons other than the offended party or those 
acting on his behalf” (Kiefer 1967: 23). Most violations fall under a category somewhat akin 
to private law, where a resolution rested on the consent of the parties to the conflict. Even 
serious cases as murder, revenge and theft or robbery were normally resolved by mediation 
and not adjudicated.8 Mediation did not aim at unearthing the truth, but at achieving an 
 
 
7  However, a 17th century author gives a different account, noting that in cases of “the unnatural crime 
[most probably homosexuality; P.K.] [...] having caged the offenders, they throw them into the sea, and 
destroy their houses and fields, by such punishment to make demonstration of their abhorrence (Combés 
1667, in: Blair/Robertson 1903-1909, vol. 40: 150), showing that respective penalties were under certain 
circumstances actually implemented.  
8  On different types of conflict resolution see Jundam (2006) for the Tausug, see also Loyre (1991) for the 
Maguindanao. For the Maranao see Bentley (1983, 1984); Sumaguina (1988); Warriner (1975a, b).  
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optimal solution to the conflict to which both parties could consent (Jundam 2006: 33-36; 
Kiefer 1972: 10). As Kiefer reports for the Tausug of the late 1960s (!):  
“All cases of murder and most cases of theft, offenses against honor, and some sexual offenses fall 
into this category. In practice the amount of centralization of leadership in a community will great-
ly affect whether the offense in any given case fall into the ‘public’ or ‘private’ sphere” (Kiefer 1967: 
23). 
3.3 Blood-feuding as a form of social control 
Irrespective of ethnic group, with respect to a large number of deviant acts, blood feuding 
was deemed to be the ethically superior way of reaction, when compared to mediation or 
adjudication. Bentley points out, that „If a disputant is determined to fight to restore his 
maratabat [honor, status; P.K.], then trying to force a settlement would be immoral“ 
(Bentley 1983: 279; Bentley 1984). The disputants’ determination to wage a feud, however, 
seems to have been directly related to his social status, feuding being mostly a prerogative 
of the ruling status groups. Higher status groups can be said to have had more honor or 
status (maratabat) that had to be defended:  
“Because of your maratabat, you have to prove to everyone in the community that you can exact 
vengeance and are capable of erasing the black mark on your forehead or your family’s. This ma-
ratabat triggers rido [blood-feud; P.K.] and complicates it“ (Interviewee, cited in: Bartolome 
2004: 53). 
Feuding had three core functions: it constituted the behavioral core of a perennial 
competition for status and power amongst the elite; it separated the elite from the lower 
classes, and it provided a mechanism of social control against norm violations within the 
ruling strata. This mechanism, however, could only prevent initial acts of violence, as it 
threatened any initial violator with massive retaliation. Whenever deterrence did not 
work, feuding violence normally had to take its course, as no side could back down too 
early without seriously damaging its maratabat. Feuding then provided part of the deter-
rence that was largely lacking in the system of mediation/arbitration, a deterrence against 
horizontal violence within the higher status groups.  
3.4 Status demonstration as social control  
Status demonstration had a similar deterrent effect threatening members of lower status 
groups with massive retaliation in case of misbehavior against members of the upper-
classes. This practice of vertical social control also survived Islamization unscathed, ex-
emplifying the rather high level of arbitrariness inherent in the overall system of political 
and social domination. The fundamental message conveyed by acts of status demonstra-
tion was, that nobody was allowed to challenge the Datu(-class). Information on such 
practices has to be culled from the descriptions of foreign travelers who for shorter or 
longer periods visited various Moro areas. Even though their prejudice must be taken into 
account, nevertheless the various accounts present a rather clear-cut picture. One of the 
earliest reports is presented by Francisco Combés in the 17th century. His description 
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gives an example of a would-be status demonstration that did not take place because of 
Spanish presence. Combés reports that in Iligan a local high ranking Muslim complained 
to him, that his wife had been insulted by a common woman, continuing: “Father, if the 
Spaniards were not here, and we could rule ourselves by our own laws, we would have 
made mincemeat [gigote] of that woman with a campilan [a single-edged sword; P.K.], 
and slaves of her brothers and sisters and relatives” (Combés 1667, in: Blair/Robertson 
1903-1909, vol. 40: 149). Combés, as later observers, regularly commented on the arbi-
trary power wielded by the Datu-class, who “meddle wherever they wish, without other 
law than their power and will and their unbridled greed, and the one injured has no re-
course” (Combés 1667, in: Blair/Robertson 1903-1909, vol. 40: 154). In the early nine-
teenth century Charles Wilke, an American captain reports, that on Sulu  
“it being treason for any low-born freeman to injure or maltreat a datu, the latter, who are of a 
haughty, overbearing, and tyrannical disposition, seldom keep themselves within bounds in their 
treatment of their inferiors” (Wilke 1842, in: Blair/Robertson 1903-1909, vol.43: 166). 
Half a century later Pio Pi, the Superior of the Jesuit Order in the Philippines, certainly 
a radical advocate of a harsh policy against the Moros, presented a manuscript to the new 
American colonial power, in which he described the Moros from a highly critical view-
point. Despite the strong prejudices pervading the document, a number of details deserve 
closer attention, as they are supported by other reports of the time. Pi for example re-
ported stories told to him about Datu Uto, the most powerful Datu of the upper valley in 
Maguindanao, in the late 19th century.9 He reports that Datu Uto punished those 
“who escaped from him [...] by cutting the tendons below the knees so that they would be unable 
to run and walk only with difficulty. Others he ordered to be bound in a place swarming with red 
ants which are very vicious [...]. Others he cause (sic) to be bound naked to the trunks of trees 
and exposed by the day to the burning rays of the sun and by night to the agonizing torments of 
the mosquitos [...]. It happened once that Uto put someone in stocks where he died slowly of 
hunger and misery” (Pi 1903, in: Davis 1903, Appendix V: 140).10 
 
 
9  A contemporary observer, Pablo Pastels, gives, in a nutshell, the local ingredients of power and authority 
by characterizing Datu Uto: “his natural talent, his prestige, his riches, his supporters and above all his 
fiery despotism, had created around him a certain air of glory which made him like a feared idol” (Pastels 
cited in Ileto 2007: 57). It should be noted, that Utos personal bodyguard did not consist of locals, but of 
banyaga slaves, who were personally bound and loyal to him, one Spaniard calling them “paid assassins” 
(Ileto 2007: 60). Uto’s reign “was marked by instances of terrorism and assassination undertaken by his 
slave army against recalcitrant datus” (Ileto 2007: 63). The basis of power then as now is: “a sizable 
amount of wealth, a strong following and firearms” (Ileto 2007: 63).  
10  This account is also mirrored in local official presentations of Moro governance. The hagiography of Datu 
Piang, who eventually toppled Uto, given in the 1952 Cotabato Guidebook, tries to legitimate his actions, 
by focusing on the defects of Uto, who as the Guidebook reports “was a very cruel ruler. The story of the 
acts he committed against his subjects are unprintable. One day the whole inhabitants of a barrio near Ot-
to’s [Uto’s; P.K.] capital at Sapakan, emigrated [...] to escape from the cruelties of Datu Otto” (Millan 
1952: 291). After Piang’s takeover, which came after a drawn-out battle, the former overlord is claimed to 
have handed the mantle of overlordship to the winner with the words: “you have demonstrated to all and 
sundry that you are a good worthy leader. I see in you the unity of our people. [...] Henceforth, you shall 
be the leader of the people” (Millan 1952: 292).  
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Broadening beyond the person of Datu Uto, Pi comments:  
Another of the punishments meted out by the dattos, is that of throwing those they wish to chas-
tise into the river with their bodies encumbered with an immense stone [...]. From the cruel Dat-
to Andung, [...] there once escaped a slave [...]. Andung [...] put him to death with a kris [dagger; 
P.K.]” (Pi 1903, Davis 1903, Appendix V: 141). 
In Jolo, Pi reports, there was a Moro, who had once disrespectfully spoken to a Datu. 
The latter ordered  
“his mouth to be slit [...] transversely, deepening it up to the articulation of the jaw-bone [...]. 
The datto remained unmolested; according to his laws or customs he could do as he wished” (ci-
tations: Davis 1903, Appendix V:  142). 
Pi’s remarks are mirrored by a description of olden times given by a local Datu:  
"To express one's opinion unasked on any question invites not only dire consequences but al-
most certain condemnation or even death. One who expresses his opinion, especially if in pro-
test against any despotic act of the ruling tyrant usually brings death upon the hapless one and 
slavery to his family. In extreme cases the offending subject may be publicly executed to give an 
example to the whole people" (cited in McKenna 1998: 65). 
The absoluteness of arbitrary rule is illustrated by a local, who revealed that a former 
Datu and his men sometimes raped “wives brought to the datu by their husbands for 
judgment”, others recalling stories “of datus raping young unmarried women accused of 
unlawful (usually premarital) sexual activity or elopement” (McKenna 1998: 63).  
The first American commander on Jolo in 1901 reported to his Superior that “the 
condition under the treaty [...] gives them [the Datus; P.K.] supreme and arbitrary power 
from which there is no appeal and allows them to do what they like with the people” 
(Kobbe 1901 in: MacArthur 1901 Appendix P: 2), an evaluation that is given ample evi-
dence in the attached report and exchange of letters between the local commanding offic-
er, the Sultan and several Datus (for the text of the letters see: MacArthur 1901, appendix 
P: 30-49). The American officer for example reports the case of one Datu, who bought 
several oranges only to discover later, that another Datu got a few more oranges for the 
same price. He went to the seller and tried to kill him with several shots, however, only 
succeeded to wound him at his elbow (MacArthur 1901, Appendix P: 47).  
All these examples illustrate that the terror-dimension probably has become much 
more prominent in status demonstrations. Whereas Placensia’s record still points to sig-
nificant norm violations which trigger status demonstrations, the outline given above 
signals, that even small infractions could trigger a massive response and that such demon-
strations in a number of cases were not preceded by norm violations at all. We now have a 
mix of discriminate and indiscriminate violence, a mix of “punishment” and pure terror. 
It certainly is no coincidence that the bodyguards of various Datus were not composed of 
members of the family or the community, but of slaves from other regions (banyaga) who 
had no other tie than to the Datu himself. If they served well, they could rise, if they pro-
voked the ire of their master, they could be put at death at will (Warren 2007: 216-217; see 
also McKenna 1998: 65).  
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3.5 The interrelationship of different forms of physical violence 
Violence had at all times an integral part in conflict resolution and social control. As 
Thomas Kiefer pointed out in his study on Violence and Law in Tausug society, physical 
violence is the appropriate reaction in a variety of situations. For the Tausug violence 
relates to being maisug, a term, which denotes  
“a kind of esthetic ideal with reference to a personal life-style; while violence may be morally 
wrong to the Tausug, it is still necessary to sustain that life-style. [...] All violent acts hinge 
around the concept of sipug, or shame. The brave man must see that his shame is erased, not 
necessarily because it is morally good to do so, but because it is necessary to sustain his self-
image as a brave man. [...] The purposes of violence determine its good or evil character, not the 
fact of violence as such” (Kiefer 1972: 53). 
Violence therefore is no last resort for upholding order, but a consciously chosen 
strategy of maximizing domination. Kiefer commenting on the possible antinomy be-
tween justice and order, argues that if both cannot be upheld at the same time, the Tausug 
always opt for the former, and may be “willing to bring down the whole world in chaos in 
order to achieve it” (Kiefer 1967: 26). The present report doubts the centrality of justice as 
a motive for violence and instead points to the pursuit of power and status, which is best 
served in the context of an ideology that legitimizes the unconditional right of the domi-
nant status groups to arbitrary forms of self-help. Violence exerted in the context of social 
control and domination was never encumbered by notions of legitimacy. As Jeremy Beck-
ett, argues in a study on Maguindanao clans, “personal power could never be contained 
by notions of order or legitimacy; to a degree power became its own legitimacy. […] final-
ly, a datu was what a datu did” (Beckett 1982: 396). Loyre in her analysis of Maguindanao 
society comes to a similar conclusion: “The common people thus lived entirely at the 
mercy of their rulers. [...] He [the ruler; P.K.] could behave as he wanted without any fear 
of punishment whereas commoners would often pay with their lives for simple misbehav-
ior” (Loyre 1991: 26). 
The view on historical practices of social control and domination has shown that vi-
olence occupies a much more central role in upholding the traditional order, than be-
comes visible in analyses which focus on the ruling ideas proclaimed by the Datus and 
Sultans. The focus on violent social practices made visible a hidden transcript of domina-
tion, which to a significant extent relied on physical violence to enforce the dominant 
order. We encounter a social order, in which the powerful ensured social control not only 
by physical punishments sanctioned by customary law, but resorted to terroristic strate-
gies of intimidation through indiscriminate violence. Whereas in other contexts resis-
tance or rebellion would have been an option, this seems not to have been the case in 
Muslim Mindanao. Here the ideology of sanctified inequality with its core building block, 
the genealogical legitimation of leadership, provided for a hegemonial worldview that 
turned being ruled (endatuan) into the unalterable natural condition for the majority of 
the people. 
At least in the late 19th century, it seems safe to conclude that various forms of social 
control violence actually lost their rationale, that would have limited them to the en-
forcement of rule-abidance. Feuding and status demonstration partly merged, losing their 
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distinctive traits. Both of them also became (or probably always had been) tightly con-
nected to raiding violence, so that theft was countered not by the feuding logic of revenge 
in the form of killing, but by counter-theft. Data are obviously hard to come by, however, 
the accusations and counteraccusations made by two opposing camps of Datus in early 
1901 give a snapshot of the actual violence patterns, as far as intergroup violence is con-
cerned.  
Losses of contending parties in one prominent “feuding” relationship on Jolo 
January-March 1901 
  freemen killed 
prisoners 
taken 
slaves 
stolen 
horses 
stolen  
fire weapons 
stolen 
buffalos 
stolen 
Sultan/Datu 
Indanan Camp 3 9 7 23 2 4 
camp opposing 
Sultan/Datu 
Indanan 
5 >38 (6 sold as slaves) 2 33 — 7 
total number 8 > 47 9 56 2 11 
Culled from letters printed in: MacArthur 1901 Appendix P: p. 26-45 
The total population of Jolo at that time stood at about 51,000 inhabitants (Census 1903: 
14). The data presented only refer to the followers of a small number of (powerful) Datus, 
and a short time span of about 3 months. As there is no information about the percentage 
of followers of the involved parties compared to the overall population of the Jolo, we can 
only calculate on the overall number of 51,000. Projected on the whole year, this would 
mean 32 killings, or 64 killings per 100,000 inhabitants, which in all probability is a very 
conservative estimate as the contending parties did not comprise the whole population of 
the Island and the parties only reported those killings that in their view could be attri-
buted to their opponents. So overall violence is supposed to have been much higher. 
These data show that mutual raiding, killing and stealing was not deemed to be some 
sort of criminal or normatively untenable behavior. Quite to the contrary, all of these 
activities were part of an action-reaction chain, through which relative status and power 
were constantly challenged and rebalanced. This can indirectly be culled from an answer 
from one of the Datus to the American commander’s order to stop stealing. He begged 
“to inform my father [the American commander; P.K.] that from the time my father re-
quested that all stealing should for the present be stopped, our men have stopped it” (let-
ter of Datu Calbi in: MacArthur, Appendix P: 44).  
20 Peter Kreuzer
 
 
4. Social order and social control after World War II 
4.1 The Social Order: Continuity amidst Change  
In the wake of the American acquisition of the Philippines from the Spanish in 1898, the 
Muslim regions, which hitherto had been self-governing units, were eventually integrated 
into the broader colonial political system. The Muslim elites had to contend with and 
adapt to the powerful new structures of the modern nation-state and democracy. At the 
same time, albeit with some delay, they were confronted with a rising tide of Christian 
settlers, who tried to make their luck in the sparsely populated regions of Muslim-
Mindanao. Finally they had to contend with revolutionary Muslim forces, led by Moro 
counter-elites who threatened the traditional Datus grip on power.  
Despite these profound changes the traditional elite of Datus survived as the locally 
dominant political actors, even though, a number of new names were added to the tradi-
tional rooster, some old names dropped and the two liberation movements had to be ac-
commodated in and outside of the new form of parliamentarian mainstream politics. 
Both the principle of sanctified inequality and the fairly unlimited power of the ruling 
Datus survived all structural changes and are still in full force today. A large number of 
locals still clings to the notion of the Datu as a hereditarily legitimated leader, equating 
Datuship with “royal descent” from both paternal and maternal sides, leading the author 
of a survey on Maguindanaoan perceptions of leadership to conclude that leaders by and 
large  
“must come from the noble families of Maguindanao. Thus traditional leaders acquire their po-
sitions through heredity. They have a stronghold on the people and even on the government sys-
tem. This explains the continuing status of the datus as traditional and political leaders” (Salazar 
1995: 46). 
Conveniently forgotten is that those “nobles” of the late colonial and post-colonial era 
“generally had only tenuous ties to the high nobility of the Cotabato sultanates, and some 
had none at all. [...] the new datus created their own martabat [status position; P.K.]” by 
factual control undergirded by a strategy of strategic marriage with females of noble des-
cent (McKenna 1998: 101). These efforts to establish themselves as traditional Datus 
aimed firstly at securing legitimacy in the eyes of the local populace and secondly at im-
pressing “American colonial agents and Christian Filipino nationalists by confirming 
their preconceptions about the continued importance of a potent and exotic Muslim no-
bility” (McKenna 1998: 103).  
Despite all the state- and democracy-building of the past century Datu-rule on the lo-
cal level is still unencumbered of any serious limitations. As one of the author’s interview 
partners pointed out, leadership still rests on fear and respect: „you have to exact fear 
from your constituents. It gets you respect“ (Interview Cotabato 2004). 
Becket in his report on the Datus of the 1950s to 1980s formulates in a similar way, 
that:  
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„By his power he [the modern Datu; P.K.] brings order into the world; by the same power he can 
destroy that order. [...] Implication in kidnappings, coups, fraud, venality, and murder do a [...] 
datu’s reputation no harm, so long as he gets away with it“ (Bentley 1994: 277). 
The crucial structural change for the Datus was twofold: firstly, from the early 20th cen-
tury onward, they were part of a much larger and potentially powerful political structure 
– the state – in which they had to find their place; secondly, whereas traditional authority 
had fused political, social, economic and cultural leadership, modern society differen-
tiated these roles and the Datus had to succeed in uniting these formally differentiated 
spheres into their hands, in order to survive as supreme class.  
Survival in the state proved rather easy, as the new Datu-politicians successfully bar-
tered votes and political loyalty for disengagement and disinterest of national politics with 
respect to their local dealings. By and large national level politicians were quite content 
with not meddling in local politics as long as the local leaders delivered votes for them. 
Thereby, the local Datu-politicians could muster the arsenal of state inducements and 
levers to further their local dominance, converting funds and budgetary allocations into 
private sources for patronage and utilizing the municipal police and the opportunity of 
establishing private armies for building up formidable instruments to assert their will. 
Inter-Datu competition continued in its modern guise of electoral politics, heavily under-
pinned by arbitrary use of physical violence.  
The modern state offered them not only options to legalize their small private armies 
by converting them into local police forces or police-auxiliaries and thereby “socialize” at 
least part of the cost, but it further helped by providing most of the weaponry. Whereas 
private armed groups existed in most parts of the Philippines at least since the early 20th 
century, their numbers most of the time not exceeded a few dozen men, only some politi-
cians commanded groups of more than 100 to a few hundred armed followers. Currently 
it is said, that in the province of Maguindanao there are 25 known private armies, 45 in 
the ARMM and 102 in the rest of Mindanao, the latter number underscoring, that the 
problem definitely is not exclusively a Muslim problem (Centre for Humanitarian Dialo-
gue 2011: 24). The Moro regions do not differ in principle; however, they slowly came to 
differ in number. Not only did they harbor a vastly disproportional number of private 
armed groups, those groups in addition were significantly larger than the “normal” ones. 
In the early 1990s one earlier MNLF commander, Tupay Loong, then governor of Sulu, is 
said to have had more than 1,000 armed followers. The current office-holder Sakur Tan 
controls up to three thousand armed men. The dreaded Ampatuan clan who dominated 
Maguindanao politics from 2001 to 2008 established a private force estimated at 3,000 to 
5,000 men. In all of these cases, the majority of armed men belonged to the police auxilia-
ries, meaning that they were paid out of state coffers. As the active involvement of high 
ranking police officers in a massacre committed by the Ampatuans in 2008 underlined, 
even the regular police was thoroughly privatized. Modernity brought another significant 
change that to a certain extent eroded the traditional mechanisms’ capacity of conflict 
settlement: modern weaponry, with a vastly superior firepower. While in earlier times 
armed clashes resulted in a certain number of wounded, modern firearms made conflicts 
much more deadly. To a certain extent, these weapons also “democratized” local fighting, 
as they enabled the single assassin, to successfully attack his enemy, even though the latter 
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may be protected by bodyguards. Whereas a certain amount of modern weapons entered 
the region since the late 19th century, the biggest change came in the wake of World War 
II and later in the course of the secessionist war.  
Despite the fact, that these two wars were important, insofar as weapons were widely 
spread, the argument that local violence exerted in the context of control and domination 
is the consequence of the massive influx of Christian settlers and four decades of civil war, 
cannot be upheld. The uses of violence in the course of local political competition and in 
social control of the general public, can be fairly well documented for the late Spanish 
time as well as the early American days, becoming prominent in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, which as mentioned above had brought a huge amount of weapons 
to the region.  
Let us then turn to post-war Jolo and adjacent small islands, which did not experience 
any influx of new Christian settlers. In 1960 the intelligence Division of the Philippine 
Army gave a quantitative overview of the local violence situation. The analysts pointed 
out, that  
“Sulu has the highest number of killings among all the provinces in the country with 179 regis-
tered murder cases and 62 homicides or a total of 241 in 1959, and a total of 243 registered 
crimes of which 47 are killing incidents from January to May 1960” (G2 Division Philippine 
Army 1960: 15, in: Department of Defense 1960). 
On a per capita basis, this amounts to 100 killings per 100,000 inhabitants for the year 
of 1959 – practically all of these killings being amongst Muslims. Eight years earlier in 
1952 a former governor of Sulu had already reported to the President about a “post-
liberation resurgence of widespread and big-scale outlawry in Sulu” (Fernandez, Leon, 
Ex-Governor of Sulu, 1952, in: Department of Defense 1960, Annex D, Enclosure 1: 1).11  
When asked for the fundamental reasons for the high levels of violence in the 1950s, 
most of the respondents (all local politicians, and other local leaders) pointed to political 
competition and family or clan feuds, with the Department of Defense officials summa-
rizing the various voices:  
“Customs and traditions still play a big role in the settling of disputes by force. The Muslims still 
take the law into their own hands in carrying out vengeance for the murder or death of their kins 
(sic) in the hands of another. […] Strong political rivalries and religious strife which foment 
clashes among opposing parties and contribute to the chaos brought about by outlawry. […] 
Land-grabbing caused by relocation of cadastral survey markers leading to family feuds and 
vendettas which exist up to now” (Department of Defense 1960: 3). 
A few years later Kiefer reports a host of revenge killings amongst the Tausug on Jolo 
for the mid-1960s, with one municipality, Luuk, which at that time probably had no more 
than 35,000 inhabitants, having at least 125 killings in a two year timespan (1964-66) 
 
 
11  In 1948 already then Sulu Congressman Sultan Ombra Amilbangsa seeked an amnesty for 15,000 Moro 
outlaws on Sulu. As the Mindanao Cross reported at the time, „there was no clear cut reason given why 
the Moros took up arms against the established authority of the province“ (Mindanao Cross 14 August 
1948: 3).  
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(Kiefer 1967: 27). This would make for a homicide rate of nearly two hundred per 100,000 
inhabitants and would mean one of the highest rates worldwide. All this violence hap-
pened on islands that were not to any significant degree influenced by transmigration, 
neither were there any visible precursors of counter-nationalistic violence.  
At least during the 1950s Maguindanao, then dominated by the “team” of Datu Udtog 
Matalam and Congressman Salipada Pendatun seems to have enjoyed significantly lower 
levels of visible violence. However, there were reports on armed clashes between the 
scions of established political clans, as for example the Sinsuat and Mangelen in Cotaba-
to,12 which led the Philippine Constabulary to place “a twenty-four hours guard in town. 
Added to this patrolling are armored cars to prevent any possible showdown as both 
camps showed signs of hostility” (Mindanao Cross 23 June 1956: 10).13 A few days later 
other young members of the Sinsuat family were reported to have shot at, but missed a 
local official (Mindanao Cross 14 July 1956: 1). The following years are replete with re-
ports on various types of killings for which generally no motive could be established and 
which seemed to have gone unpunished (see reporting in Mindanao Cross).  
The most crucial change with respect to political dominance in Muslim regions was 
the development of the insurrection forces of the MNLF in the late 1960s and later the 
MILF, both of which were led by Muslim counter-elites, who aimed not only at self-
determination for the Moros, but also at social reform and a reframing of Datu-rule on 
the line of a more responsible and morally sound governance. However, the Datu-class 
fairly easily survived this threat to its predominance, by partly joining the movements and 
at the same time working on the side of the government, by co-opting strong movement 
leaders and letting them set up certain personal fiefdoms, by allowing movement cadres 
to take part in local and regional politics in order to drive them out of these positions after 
they had lost their military clout. One example of a co-opted leader would be Muslimin 
Sema, a core-leader of the MNLF and in the meantime one of the most powerful local 
politicians in Cotabato City, whose wife, who is related to both the Sinsuat and the Ampa-
tuan Clans, managed to become congresswoman in the 2010 elections. During his first 
term as mayor of Cotabato City, Muslimin Sema expounded his understanding of leader-
ship in the following way:  
„We respect our father. Whatever our father says, it goes. And the Filipinos as a family, the fa-
ther dictates the family. And the family is a small governance. [...] There must be some power 
 
 
12  The Sinsuat Clan had dominated local politics until 1953, when one family member lost in the mayoral 
race for Cotabato City to Datu Luminog Mangelen, who could count on the help of provincial Governor 
Matalam and Congressman Pendatun.  
13  Information on earlier feuding is rather sparse; however, the Mindanao Cross provides a lot of informa-
tion on feuding in the 1950s, in which the Sinsuat Clan featured prominently. For a detailed account of 
one earlier feud between the Mastura and the Sinsuat clans in 1940 see Horn (1941: 166-168). For a later 
clash involving members of the Sinsuat clan and resulting in several deaths, see Mindanao Cross (3 May 
1969: 1, 10). 
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imposed in the family. So that the children will not make foolishness. [...] So the government 
must have the authority to discipline the children“ (Interview Cotabato 2004).14 
Finally, even the MILF leadership is still thinking in categories of the primacy of the 
Datus within a system of sanctified inequality, as for example its vice chairman for politi-
cal affairs, Gazali Jafaar, who in an interview with the author in 2005 stated: 
“Speaking of Datu, royal blood. It is not a problem for us. You know why? Many of our leaders 
belong to the royal blood. You know, one of our senior leaders here is also a Datu. He is our 
Vice-chairman in one of the provincial committees, Datu Tak [?]. There are leaders here from 
South Kutawato15, from Pulumuluk [?], who belong to the Datu. So we don’t see this a problem 
for us” (Gazali Jafaar Interview 27 November 2005).  
Currently the Datus have to share power with the MILF and the various remnants of 
the MNLF, however, it stands to reason, that the Datus will not only survive a peace 
agreement, but after a short period become dominant in any future polity as well.16 The 
MILF deals with them, as if the Datus were the heads of political fiefdoms. Jafaar for ex-
ample pointed out that the MILF meets  
“with the representatives of the Datus, right here, Dimapalan, the Ampatuans, the Candao, the 
Baraguir, the Mastura. We met here. The purpose is to rally the support of everybody for finding 
a just and lasting solution to the problem and the effective implementation of that solution. And 
they all agreed” (Gazali Jafaar Interview 27 Nov 2005). 
This realism of the MILF-leader acknowledges the Datus and their Clans as the real ru-
lers of the lands: The Masturas ruling in the former municipality of Nuling, the Sinsuats 
in Dinaig, the Matalams in Pagalungan, the Midtimbang in Talayan, the Paglas in Datu 
Paglas, the Ampatuan in Datu Piang, Maganoy and Ampatuan municipality, the Mangu-
dadatu in Buluan. “Clan politics remains strong in the province. Within the small fief-
dom, the clan determines the leadership. But in the province, leadership belongs to any-
one who can establish the greater alliance among these small Lords” (Mercado 2010). In 
the elections of 2010 in Maguindanao this meant a confrontation between two teams 
 
 
14  A more drastic version of this self-concept is given by Wahab Akbar, Governor of Basilan and Congress-
man, who was killed in a bombing in 2007. He stated that people probably do not understand him, but: „It 
would be better to kill 10 suspects than to let the criminals go and let everybody suffer [...]. I have to be 
tough. I have to be a dictator. I must not show pity. [...] I have no time to explain to them what I am do-
ing. I have no time to play politics. I have a lot of work to do. [...] Nobody should question me. I am the 
governor. I will do what I believe is good for the people, whether they like it or not, whether they will love 
me for it or not. I don’t care“ (Akbar cited in GMA News 2007). While denying to having ordered killings, 
his remarks clearly illustrate the role of killing in competition and control: „I haven’t killed anybody. Peo-
ple look at me as if I am a killer, but nobody has been killed on my order. Many asked for my permission 
to kill, but I would always ask, is there really a need to kill?“ (Akbar cited in GMA News 2007).  
15  The Maguindanaoan Kutawato stands for „stone fort“ and is another reading of Cotabato.  
16  Symbolically the encompassing pre-eminence of the Datu becomes visible in the practice of naming new 
or renaming old municipalities with the names of prominent Moros of royal blood, as for example Datu 
Abdullah Sangki, Datu Anggal Midtimbang, Datu Hoffer Ampatuan, Datu Paglas, Datu Piang, Datu Sali-
bo, Datu Saudi-Amptuan, Datu Unsay, General Salipada Pendatun, Rajah Buayan, Mangudadatu, Shariff 
Aguak, Shariff Saydona Mustapha, and Sultan sa Barongis, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura.  
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claiming royal blood – the Ampatuan-Sinsuat against the Mangdudadatu-Mastura tan-
dem.  
The only institution that by and large was discarded without any problems during the 
last century was the Sultanate. Even though a number of self-proclaimed sultans still exist, 
their political influence is next to zero, and the title of Sultan does not add additional fea-
tures to the picture of the Datu-politician. When for example the old Datu Sinsuat, who 
carried the title of Sultan died in 1928, the Sinsuats let more than 50 years pass by, until 
they installed a successor Blah Mama Sinsuat (Salazar 1995: 58).  
4.2 Social Control in the Muslim Regions 
During the last decade official data on violence are down significantly, local police claiming 
about 30 killings (murder + manslaughter) in Cotabato City and about 22 in neighboring 
Sultan Kudarat province per year in 2009 and 2010.17 Sulu police reports astonishingly low 
numbers of between 2 and 5.5 killings per 100.000 for the years 2002 to 2006,18 which, how-
ever, considering the reports on crime and violent feuding on the islands seem to be highly 
unrealistic.19  
If this relative downturn compared to the above cited data on the 1950s and 1960s was 
taken at face value, this would firstly mean, that the pre-civil war era had been much more 
violent than the current time, once more supporting this report’s argument, that the 
problems of violence do not result from the civil war, but precede him. While pre-war 
violence could to a certain extent be connected to a settler influx in Mindanao in the 
 
 
17  Own calculation on basis of data provided by Cotabato City Police in December 2010. By international 
standards 22 or 30 killings per 100,000 inhabitants is still very high. Data on types of violence traditionally 
connected to state control are hard to come by, however, according to the counting of the Human Rights 
Commission Cotabato is one of the cities with the highest numbers of enforced disappearances during the 
decade from 2001-2010, with respect to summary killings the provinces of Maguindanao and Basilan 
likewise belong to the negative examples with 57 and. 48 victims respectively (Rosales 2011). However, 
there exist worse cases in all of these categories in Christian regions, illustrating that the problem of vi-
olence detailed in this report is not exclusive to the Muslim regions, but spread all over the Philippines.  
18  Own calculation on the basis of PNP data (Province of Sulu no year given, 64).  
19  In addition it might be noted, that numbers tend to diminish, as they go up the bureaucratic ladder, as 
experienced by the author in the case of Negros Occidental. Here official data given to the author by the 
provincial PNP showed crime levels that were three times higher than the ones printed in the Provincial 
Outlook published by the Provincial Statistics Office purportedly on data provided by the provincial PNP. 
Likewise, data obtained directly from the PNP showed a much lower crime resolution rate, than the ones 
given in the provincial outlooks. See also the new UNODC report on homicide; according to this report 
the Muslim regions together with the National Capital region are those with the lowest number of homi-
cides and the lowest number of crimes involving firearms (UNODC 2011: 47). These results are best ex-
plained by significant underreporting and probably reduction of numbers as data go upwards the bureau-
cratic ladder.  
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1950s and 1960s this is definitely not possible for violence on the Sulu Archipelago, which 
was and still is dominated by a Muslim population.  
Secondly, while not being able to go into details, it is important to point out, that state 
institutions neither then nor now play any significant role in controlling or suppressing 
violence, hindering locals to utilize “their” various peaceful and violent mechanisms for 
dealing with norm violations or providing viable alternative ones.20  
The state security institutions, most notably the police, generally were made subser-
vient to the local political overlord.21 There also was and still is a broad-based practice of 
non-cooperation with state institutions, rendering them helpless. Finally, the state securi-
ty institutions were never able to deal with serious cases of deviance due to lack in man-
power and equipment. Likewise the legal system has always and still is largely irrelevant 
for the resolution of conflict and the application of social control. Most cases were and 
still are docketed as soon as they arrive at the courts, one crucial reason being that  
“after the filing of a criminal case in the court, the relatives of the disputants on both sides would 
stop them from going to the court for formal trial of their case. Instead, the relative would per-
suade them to submit their case for traditional amicable settlement” (Sumaguina 1988: 81).  
Various types of state-sponsored institutions for conflict resolution and social control 
like the Shariah courts and the Barangay Justice System seem hardly to be functioning 
even within their rather narrow jurisdictions, so that during the last few years, there has 
been a tendency of civil society organizations to develop new semi-traditional institutions 
which were tasked with resolving a host of intra-community conflicts up to longstanding 
blood-feuds and seem to have met with some success in the meantime. The drawback of 
this strategy of outsourcing responsibility has been that the already very weak legitimacy 
of formal state actors – judiciary and police) – was further undermined. At the same time 
the legitimacy of the new agents was not institution- but person-based. No alternative 
institutional set-up for dealing with conflicts could be put into place. Then as now, social 
control is largely beyond the purview of the state.  
 
 
20  Kiefer for example noted for the 1960s that “In some very large feuds involving hundreds of participants 
and many warrants of arrests, an informal agreement will often be worked out among the principals to the 
feud, political leaders, the municipal judges, prosecuting attorney, as well as the Constabulary, in which 
the feud will be settled by traditional means. Then all warrants of arrest will be dropped in return for the 
surrender of several firearms to the Constabulary” (Kiefer 1972: 139).  
21  Hard data to prove this impression which is general local knowledge and put forward by all interview 
partners is not easy to come by. However, in 1969 already the Mindanao Cross reported that local police-
men had informed them, “that the police department is politics-ridden and lacking in proper organiza-
tion. [...] ‘We don’t choose our men. Politicians give them to us,’ this officer continued” Mindanao Cross 
22 March 1969: 1) 
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4.3 Mediation and Adjudication beyond the State 
By and large the most important institution of social control, tasked with mediating and 
adjudicating conflicts up to the present still is the local Datu and corresponding institu-
tions/groups centering around him. However, the Datu’s role seems to have been chang-
ing over the decades.  
A respondent, characterizing Maguindanao society in the 1960s confirmed the still un-
limited authority of the Datu. According to her, herself a descendant of one of the most 
powerful Datus of the time: “In the 60s and the 70s whatever the Datu says, everybody 
listens, whatever the Datu says, everybody believes, and whatever he says, everybody fol-
lows” (Interview Cotabato 201022). Even though formally against the law, the Datu effec-
tively was master of life and death in the areas and for the population he controlled.23 He 
at that time still imposed the death penalty, as an interview partner pointed out: „If my 
grandfather [a prominent Datu; P.K.] finds the accusation as right or true then something 
happens, like, you would just say: ‘you kill that guy, because he is not doing anything 
good in the community’“ (Interview Cotabato 2010). 
Even though many Datus at that time had already remade themselves into politicians, 
thereby fusing the authority base of the traditional with the modern leader (Saber 1982), 
their legitimacy as mediators and adjudicators with a sanctified right to impose their or-
der on any dissenter still rested on their traditional authority and it might be added on 
their local monopoly on the legitimate use of violence,24 as another interview partner, 
imagining himself as a Datu pointed out:  
„I am the Datu, [...]. I am not showing my fire power, but everybody knows that I have the pow-
er and the monopoly. [...] First, I, as the mediator would rely on the respect I enjoy from the 
community. But everybody knows there is also an unverbalized statement that I can impose jus-
tice. I can enforce“ (Interview Cotabato 2010). 
Politization and integration into the modern state institutions in the long run actually 
diminished the capacity of the Datus to provide effective dispute resolution, as evidenced 
by a survey in Maranao areas in the late 1980s already. There was already a significant 
difference with respect to the people’s satisfaction with the dispute resolutions as per-
 
 
22  This interview as well as the interviews cited below was taken in late 2010 in Cotabato City, Davao and 
Manila. They were anonymized in order to protect the identity of the interviewee. 
23  Nevertheless Datus and other elite members had to compromise with reality at least since the late 1950s, 
when levels of violence in Maguindanao and Lanao began to rise, mostly in the guise of banditry. Inge-
nious ways for dealing with new challenges were already developed in the 1960s and 1970s, illustrating, 
that control on a factual level was circumscribes. The Mindanao Cross for example reports one new strat-
egy against the rampant practice of cattle rustling, which initiated in 1970: a solemn pledge on the Quran 
by all Muslim barrio officials that they would help each other “in wiping out cattle rustling and other 
forms of crimes”. The local Datu promised “to help any captured outlaw provided the outlaw or rustler 
would promise before the Koran to reform and return to normal life” (Mindanao Cross 16 May 1970: 2). 
24  For this reason every local politician as well as many Datus without official position had their small pri-
vate army, which officially often posed as municipal police.  
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formed by the traditional as against the modern (state-based) institutions. Whereas 77 
percent of respondents were highly satisfied and the remaining 23 percent nearly satisfied 
with the settlements provided by the traditional totonganaya and agama structures, the 
corresponding numbers for the Barangay institutions are 36 percent and 57 percent re-
spectively with 7 percent feeling little or not satisfied (Sumaguina 1988: 77). Participation 
of political leaders was accepted, as long as these were at the same time perceived to be 
legitimated as traditional leaders, resulting in a type of participation, in which  
“local government authorities [...] participated in the amicable settlement of disputes by assert-
ing both their political and traditional powers and influences, by collaborating with the tradi-
tional leaders, and by applying largely the [...] indigenous and Islamic laws rather than the gov-
ernment system of law or the newly formulated rules of Barangay justice for the amicable 
settlement of disputes” (Sumaguina 1988: 80).  
The problem seems to lie in the falling apart of the Datu as the supreme respected tra-
ditional leader and the politician, who while carrying the Datu-title, is no longer respected 
in a traditional context. The enmeshment of Datus in politics remakes them into parti-
sans, thereby damaging their image as a kind of neutral force. As at times Datus opposed 
politicians (controlling private goons and the local police), they no longer could easily 
enforce their rulings, therefore abstaining from mediating or adjudicating in order not to 
damage their reputation. There is further a growing suspicion “some kind of manipula-
tions do sometimes occur in favor of the rich, powerful and relatives of the datus and 
political powerholders” (Sumaguina 1988: 84-85).  
With the continued politization of the Datus clearly their traditional standing suffered 
as their actions became more visibly focused on political gain. Whereas  
“this are still the same clans, but [...] the war [...] showed both to the elites as well as their consti-
tuencies that the elites can choose to ignore, the powerful can chose to ignore the powerless for 
the simple reason that they have the power“ (Interview Cotabato 2010). 
Since the turn of the Millennium alternative fora for dispute resolution were created 
which tried to provide modified versions of the traditional practices. Whereas a number 
of such institutions were created by civil society actors, the most prominent of them is the 
Shariah Court system of the MILF, which according to the judgment of all interview part-
ners enjoys a good reputation for swift and just proceedings and judgments. These new 
institutions tend to replace the traditional as well as the state based ones, as these are seen 
as no longer credible or are simply no longer existent:  
„in the rural areas [...] the barangay justice does not work. The mayor is not seen, the barangay 
captain is not seen. So the pragmatic reason for going to the MILF is because of accessibility, [...] 
the one institution that is constantly present in their communities is the MILF. Why [...] ap-
proach the MILF? [...] One obviously, insofar as these communities are concerned, it has the 
credibility“ (Interview Cotabato 2010). 
The underground MILF Shariah Court seems to be fairly widespread and seems even 
to be used sporadically in urban areas. The courts deal with the whole range of conflicts 
from small breaches of local customs and norms (dealt with in the arbitration councils) to 
grave cases like rape and murder, a number of interview partners emphasizing that grave 
cases can only be resolved by the MILF courts in rural areas. In past years there have been 
a number of much debated death penalties handed down by MILF courts.  
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In addition, there were efforts to codify Muslim personal law beyond the purview of 
the official Shariah Court system as for example the new Tausug Customary Law, which 
was codified by a Committee staffed by local religious, political and social leaders and 
passed into law in 2002. The problem with such efforts is that only a small number of 
offenses can be dealt with, as officially customary law can neither contravene Philippine 
law nor go beyond the boundaries of personal law. Even though criminal cases are still 
widely mediated or arbitrated in traditional fora, this cannot be done officially, as legally 
these fora neither have jurisdiction over these cases nor do the resolutions correspond to 
Philippine national law. The language employed in such efforts, however, shows that they 
actually relate to a much vaster range of offenses, that corresponding reactions to norm 
violations go way beyond the legally permissible, that violations of norms or laws are still 
predominantly understood as conflicts between two parties and not as breaches of and 
that the right of the aggrieved parties to resort to self-help is still accepted. If for example 
a man and a woman of legal age elope in order to marry, the man has to pay 2,000 Pesos 
to the woman’s family “in consideration to buy peace”; afterwards negotiations for a dow-
ry and a bridal gift (ungsod, mahr) have to commence, “the amount must not be less than 
twenty thousand [...] pesos” (Sanguniang Panlalawigan Sulu Province 2002: Article 1). 
Touching a woman “with lewd design … against the latter’s will” is, similar to the old Sulu 
code, prohibited and carries specified fines relating to the part of the body touched and 
the time of the day (Article 3). A case of forcible abduction is also included in the custo-
mary law code. Once more the man has to send a significant amount of money 25,000 
pesos) to the woman’s family in “consideration to buy peace while the negotiation is on-
going” (Sanguniang Panlalawigan Sulu Province 2002: Article 1). Even attempted rape is 
dealt with in the code, once more the initial step “to buy peace” is by paying a specified 
amount of money, that enables the commencements of negotiations between the man’s 
and the woman’s family (Article 4).  
In all of these cases the Code is silent on the consequences of a failure in negotiation. 
Likewise there are no regulations in this Code dealing with more serious violations like 
rape, manslaughter or murder, even though the style of the formulations make it plausible 
to assume that they are also dealt with under an officially non-existent code, which is 
structured accordingly: forcing the payment of a certain amount of money as a kind of 
deposit, that enables negotiations between the parties and, if these are successful a fine 
dependent on the status of the perpetrator and victim.25 It stands to reason that traditional 
 
 
25  Then as now, most cases, not being understood as offenses against the community or the moral order, but 
as conflicts between contending parties that have to be settled, are dealt with through mediation, includ-
ing murder, major theft and a number of conflicts “involving insults to honor” (Kiefer 1972: 101). The 
aim of mediation is not so much to establish the truth, actually, as Kiefer argues “the outstanding charac-
teristic of legal procedure in mediation is the irrelevance of the facts of the case to the mediator; settle-
ment does not involve ‘looking for the truth’ but rather ‘looking for goodness’” (Kiefer 1972: 101), mean-
ing a resolution to which both parties agree. Typical cases for judgment are sexual offenses, abduction of 
women and the killing of a close kinsman, as well as sins against Islamic religious norms. As Kiefer re-
ports about a case of a woman who had sexual intercourse with the brother of her husband, the punish-
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practices apply in all those cases, where either a successful resolution through negotiation 
cannot be concluded or where the violation or the sanction are beyond Philippine law or 
constitution. This for example was the case in the large numbers of rapes that occurred on 
Sulu in 2008 and 2009. The number of victims is unclear; numbers vary between 25 and 
more than 100. What is clear is that young members of dominant clans and their body-
guards were implicated. Officially these cases are still unresolved, the local chief of the 
police even arguing that „(m)ost of those complaints filed here had been withdrawn by 
the complainants, who later claimed that they agreed to have sex with their supposed 
attackers“ (Usman Pingay, PNP Provincial Director Jolo; cited in Inquirernet 30 Sept 
2009). All of my interview partners argued that the issue had been resolved in the “tradi-
tional way”, or to cite one of them: “What happened in Sulu, [...] the victims and their 
families were dealt with [in] two ways: a combination of being paid off and threatened” 
(Interview Cotabato City 2010).  
Tradition then is not simply another way of resolving conflict. When it comes to 
crimes committed by the powerful, it becomes visible, that the settlements directly reflect 
the power-asymmetries. Whereas in former times this might have been accepted as a nat-
ural state of affairs, this is no longer the case. The system’s legitimacy is dwindling, how-
ever, an alternative is lacking, as “the state” with its supposedly neutral institutions of 
police and system of justice is effectively in the hands of the local elite, who do not shy 
away of violently demonstrating the fundamental message that you never challenge the 
Lord. While the system of sanctified inequality is still respected, in the meantime it has to 
be undergirded by the vastly superior firepower of the elite, who has transformed the local 
state into a servant of their needs and interests.  
Despite the weakening of traditional institutions, which also became part of a tho-
roughly politicized overall order, the local perception on social control which is mostly 
framed in terms of conflict between distinct parties still resembles former times. Media-
tion and amicable settlement being the only strategy perceived as viable on the local level. 
Even local members of various militias perceive themselves as active peacebuilders insofar 
as their stated aim was the facilitation of amicable settlement and that they were engaged 
in “helping in peace negotiations among armed conflicting individuals/groups as their 
most important role”. At the same time a large proportion of them answered, “that they 
do not have any idea of how conflict could be prevented” or “how to promote reconcilia-
tion because of the complexities of the situation” (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
2011: 42-43). Clearly the norm of mediation/arbitration prevails whereas the means to do 
so successfully dwindle as mediators proliferate while at the same time losing the undis-
puted acceptance by the parties to the conflicts.  
 
 
ment is standardized (in this case a fine, a ritual whipping and a cleansing ritual), the aim of the judicial 
procedure being to determine the truth and mete out appropriate punishment as the deviant act is a dan-
ger to the whole community (Kiefer 1972: 98).  
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4.4 Blood-feuding as a form of social control  
Similar to former times, feuding is still mostly a mechanism of “horizontal control” tar-
geting members of a similar status group, and it is also still morally superior to direct 
mediation in many cases, as reflected in the comment of an interview partner in 201026: 
“To the Maguindanaos it’s the Maratabat. To the Tausug it’s the Sipug, the honor. They can 
fight for it, just to maintain the honor and prestige of a family. They can die for it” (Inter-
view Cotabato 2010). 
Ignoring the demands of the feud is hardly possible, as there is still a strong peer group 
pressure to fulfill the corresponding role expectations, for the individual there is only the 
“choice between complete ostracism, becoming a nobody, and taking the offender’s life and 
thus remain a ‚somebody‘, a respectable person and clan member‘“ (Bartolome 2004: 63). In 
addition, as in former times, the typical perpetrator is better educated than the local average 
(Matuan 2007: 83-84), making blood feud still predominantly an upper-class phenomenon. 
Then as now, the decision to look for a mediator still rests wholly with the conflict parties 
themselves. As one local politician explains: “[...] the revenge killing starts until it reaches a 
saturation point [...]’. The social control is the violence of the Rido, the blood-feud” (In-
terview Manila 2010). However, “saturation” seems to be more and more difficult to 
reach, as firstly modern weaponry enhances the firepower of the contending parties, ac-
cepted mediators are not easily to be found, the mediators have partly lost their local mo-
nopoly of firepower and have to consider a number of political factors and finally feuding 
is instrumentalized for either defending or gaining status and political power against op-
ponents, becoming enmeshed with the regular political competitions for the host of elec-
tive positions without which patronage cannot be dispensed in the absence of alternative 
sources of financial and other means.27  
Blood-feuding is at least as prominent in the present as it was in the past. A number of 
studies suggest that blood-feuding actually increased both in number and in ferocity 
(Torres ed. 2007), to a certain extent losing its preventive function, while amplifying its 
destructive dimension. In 2010 for example there were at least 13 cases of large scale feud-
 
 
26  This appraisal is supported by survey data. More than 70% of the population of the ARMM believe that in 
cases of murder, rape or physical injury the aggrieved party should retaliate (SWS 2005; Mangahas 2009). 
Other studies show that the overwhelming majority of Maranao would not report a killing to the police, if 
this killing happened within the context of a feud. They prefer self-help strategies, not wanting to be seen 
as cowardly and believing that imprisonment is no adequate punishment (Matuan 2007: 81). Current pat-
terns closely resemble earlier ones, surveyed in the late 1960s. Then Muslims on the one hand showed a 
significantly higher level of fear of being killed, while at the same time answering “more frequently that 
killing is permissible in retaliation for injury or insult to honor” than other Filipinos (Averch/Koehler/ 
Denton 1971: 129). 
27  While this politization is sometimes understood to be a rather new phenomenon, it must be pointed out, 
that feuding has always been enmeshed with politics and power. Reports of assassinated politicians can al-
ready be found in the 1950s and 1960s, even though the numbers probably were smaller. Then as now, in 
most cases the killers are not caught, however, there seldom seems to have been any doubt amongst the 
locals about the perpetrators and the reasons for the action.  
32 Peter Kreuzer
 
 
ing in the province of Maguindanao and directly adjacent regions, which cost at least 18 
lives and led to the temporary displacement of more than 7000 families and the burning 
of more than 200 houses. The number of 9 wounded most probably is due to severe un-
derreporting. Only three of the feuds broke out twice in this year, however, in four cases, 
the armed clashes lasted for more than one and up to four days, illustrating that currently 
feuds not seldom resemble warfare or low-intensity conflict.28 Large clans with modern 
heavy weapons “fight each other behind lines, standard trenches, and foxholes” (Durante 
et al. 2007: 98).29  
A large number of ridos are left unsettled and can be dormant for years and even dec-
ades, without being forgotten. If and when ridos are dealt with, it is exclusively within the 
purview of the traditional conceptualization of mediation and amicable settlement. 
“In mediation, the mediators do not only facilitate communication and negotiations, but also as-
sume responsibility for raising the required blood money. These mediators may be relatives of 
the conflicting parties, the council of elders, the local chief executive, the military or women ‘in-
fluentials’. Amicable settlement which is a ‘win-win solution’ is invoked as mediators highlight 
the value of personal interrelatedness like being magdanakan (members of the same nuclear 
family), da laha (blood relatives), da omboh (descended from the same ancestor), da leod (mem-
bers of the same clan), da kaoman (belonging to the same community), da pehak (members of 
the same ethnic group), or magdanakan ma agama (brothers in faith). 
The resolution process entails the following steps: declaration of ceasefire, dialogue with both 
parties, agreement on settlement and finally a religious and/or community celebration or Kan-
duli. The settlement agreement may entail payment of blood money, signing of agreement 
and/or swearing on the Holy Qur’an” (Ateneo de Zamboanga University Research Center/Notre 
Dame University Research Center 2005: ii-iii) 
4.5 Status demonstration as social control 
Arbitrary demonstrations of superior status, which carry the message that subordinates 
better never challenge the Lord, are still rampant. Most prominent (and best docu-
mented) are the actions of the overlords of Maguindanao during the last decade: the Am-
patuan Clan under its patriarch Datu Andal Ampatuan. Reacting to the killing of one of 
 
 
28  Based on local sources, not to be named.  
29  Large scale fighting, however, has a long history. The year 1970 for example saw a shootout between two 
clans in the small town of Dinaig, leaving at least five dead and 10 injured (Mindanao Cross 28 February 
1970: 1, 10). A few weeks earlier three people died and three were wounded in a drive-by shooting at a 
Barrio councilor’s house in another small town (Mindanao Cross 3 January 1970: 1), a pattern which be-
came more prominent in later decades up to now. In December of the same year, the Mindanao Cross re-
ported a “Datu Piang gunbattle” – an armed encounter between two Datus and their armed followers 
(amongst them policemen), that left six men dead and several wounded (Mindanao Cross 26 December 
1970: 3). The same day saw the murder of a District Engineer, who was assassinated by several men 
“known to belong to political families” (page 12). All of this happened independently from the ongoing 
news of Christian Muslim, Muslim Lumad and Lumad Christian clashes and armed robberies, which he-
ralded the civil war that was to begin a few months later.  
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their members, they are said to have killed more than 100 people, a number of these being 
dismembered alive with chainsaws, others hacked to death with machetes (Interviews 
Cotabato City 2004; HRW 2010: 37). The message was one of total power and authority.  
This kind of violence is accompanied by sexual violence of unknown proportions. 
What is clear is that during the last decade members of powerful Datu families raped large 
numbers of women and girls, without ever being punished. Whereas in a “normal” case of 
rape, the victim’s family would have taken revenge, this was clearly impossible in such 
cases. Asked why the victims’ families did not resort to revenge (pagbunu), one interview 
partner, a Muslim human rights lawyer stated categorically: „No chance. They would be 
massacred“ (Interview Davao 2010). The state justice system provides no alternative as 
another local interview partner commenting on similar cases, argued that  
„Now for the authorities, basically the problem is, majority of the perpetrators are rich. Some-
times they are the sons of politicians. So authorities here will find it hard. There was one case 
here in Cotabato City was gang rape. Now she went to the police and to a point that there was a 
lawyer from Manila who offered help. Now they were supposed to investigate on her case. The 
perpetrators were all sons related to big political families here in Cotabato City. The victim de-
cided not to push through with the case because they were threatened. It‘s not only the victim 
but the whole family and even the lawyer was threatened by the family. So, they ended up, you 
know, it went to nothing“ (Interview Cotabato City 2010). 
All of these cases illustrate one common pattern: such violence is arbitrary, only de-
pending on considerations of prudence, and it is applied by members of the most power-
ful Datu families against ordinary people. Whereas the rapes are certainly not intended as 
social control, they nevertheless function in that way, highlighting the fundamental 
asymmetry of power and forcing the people into total submission.  
5. Conclusion: persistence and change of violent social control 
The foregoing analysis can be condensed to the following main theses with respect to 
governance and social control in the Muslim regions of Mindanao and the Sulu archipe-
lago:  
Social order itself was and still is characterized by an all-encompassing stress on inhe-
rited status (sanctified inequality) paired with an ideology focusing on the perennial com-
petition between members of the superior status group. While Datus to a certain extent 
could rely on their noble status for legitimacy, they had also perennially to prove their 
leadership qualities. A readiness to resort to violence seems to have been a crucial aspect 
in this respect at all times, as charisma was tightly connected to the leader as a superior 
warrior. 
Social control was and still is accomplished through three mechanisms, none of which 
had a universal application: mediation/adjudication, feuding, and status demonstration. 
Actual arenas and patterns of social control differed according to status and relationship 
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between contending parties. Violence always had a crucial role in social control in the 
Muslim regions of the Philippines.  
Mediation proved to be a mechanism mostly used in conflicts amongst members of 
subaltern groups. It is predominantly a mechanism for the resolution of conflict amongst 
equals through the more or less authoritative intervention of mediators/judges of higher 
social standing. When used in vertical conflicts, it favors the powerful party.  
Feuding violence still works as a mechanism of mutual recognition amongst the mem-
bers of a predominant status group and as a practice delimiting the superior from the 
inferior status groups. However, it seems to have diffused downward to a certain extent, 
nevertheless, it is still a practice for dealing with horizontal conflicts between parties of 
roughly equal social standing. Feuding is always bilateral violence, the initial norm viola-
tor, against whom the initial act of social control violence is directed, becoming the con-
trolling agent himself. An act of social control thereby becomes an act of deviance in need 
of control. The feud includes violence-inhibiting or regulating factors as it rests on the 
mutually assured massive response of the opposing party, making norm violations poten-
tially very costly.  
Status demonstrations are crucial means for upholding the social order of sanctified 
inequality. They rest on the assumed asymmetry of the parties which precludes feuding. 
Actually the confirmation of the fundamental asymmetry is the major message of status 
demonstrations, some of which may be reactions to perceived deviant acts; others, how-
ever, seem to be primarily focused on the demonstration of the unlimited power of the 
ruling Datu (and his family) over the dependents and therefore needs no preceding norm 
violation at all. To a certain extent arbitrary power and control can only be demonstrated 
through acts of arbitrary violence that are only faintly (if at all) connected to deviant acts. 
These acts aim at underwriting the most fundamental norm of the system of domination, 
that the power of the Datu is in principle unlimited and unrestrained and that the Datu 
not only brings order into the world, but likewise can use his power to destroy that order. 
While in everyday social control mediation and adjudication are most prominent, the 
iron fist of repressive and competitive violence has always been and still is of crucial im-
portance for the continued reproduction of the social system itself. It is in violent practice 
that the claim to sanctified inequality is upheld by unilateral shows of force against infe-
riors and exclusive feuding practices amongst the higher status groups.  
In actual practice, upholding norms and upholding power relationships was at all 
times enmeshed and much of physical violence results from efforts to uphold positions of 
power, even if framed in the language of norm violation and its control.  
Norms on culturally appropriate behavior are shared by the public, are non-rival and 
non-excludable and insofar resemble public goods. However, their enforcement through 
sanctions generally depends exclusively on private initiative. All three building blocks of 
the system of social control – mediation, feud, status demonstration – rest either totally or 
to a large extent on a self-help conception of social control. Law in effect only comes in in 
a rather small number of violations, which are formally adjudicated and can carry heavy 
penalties (witchcraft, sorcery). In other cases of serious norm violation (rape, adultery, 
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incest) self-help or mediation, based on the consent of the contending parties is still pre-
valent. Social control is still partly organized along the lines of (violent) self-help. In many 
cases there is no third party involved in conflict regulation (feud, status demonstration). 
Even where it is involved, representing a certain amount of objectification of the norma-
tive order, this is not equivalent to the invention of an authoritative judicial decision, that 
can go against the will of one or both parties to the conflict. In many cases, the “verdict” is 
not more than a mediated compromise acceptable to the two parties, thereby underlining 
the autonomy of the parties to the conflict. When there is a decision by the council of 
elders or the Datu, which qualifies as arbitration or even adjudication, this is clearly the 
exemption to the rule, the employment of physical violence in reaction to norm-
violations in most cases not originating from a formal verdict.  
Local society in Muslim Mindanao at least since the establishment of the Sultanates 
can no longer be categorized as a non-state society. However, in crucial respects up to the 
present it does not fully qualify as a state-based society, insofar as much conflict resolu-
tion and (violent) social control are left to non-state societal actors (kinship groups), who 
either resolve the conflict within a feuding frame or themselves chose the mediator. As 
Trotha argues for non-law societies (rechtsfreie Gesellschaften): “advisors and mediators 
do not render judgements, as it is characteristic for all non-law societies, that no relevant 
decision-making power is transferred to institutions, which are situated beyond the basic 
social units, be it household, lineage or clan. Correspondingly the normative order stays 
subject to the monopoly of interpretation (Definitionsmacht) of the parties” (Hanser/ 
Throtha 2002: 112; translation P.K.). This is reflected in the consistent categorization of 
practically all types of crimes and norm-transgressions as conflicts that have to be settled, 
instead of violations of a law, that has to be upheld and enforced in the course of a legal 
proceeding concluded by a judgement. Then as now, the prime rationale is that the partic-
ipants agree that justice has been done.  
This is not to say that everyday life was or is always marked by violence, nor to deni-
grate the efficacy of various mechanisms for mediation, through which the bulk of con-
flicts are resolved peacefully and most of the time with the consent of the contending par-
ties. Whereas there is a danger, that in a study focusing on violence, its role or prevalence 
are exaggerated, such a study makes violent practices visible, that are normally hidden 
behind the regular practices of violence-free conflict resolution and a tendency in the 
literature to view social systems and social control from a “functionalist” perspective, 
emphasizing those structures, norms and practices that work together to enable the con-
tinued functioning of a stable and cohesive system. It is important to note that while the 
violence-free practice of mediation at all times seems to have predominated, it neverthe-
less has been complemented by a host of violent practices, which neither the introduction 
of the Sultanate nor the even more powerful conception and institutions of the modern 
nation-state were able to erase and bring under the control of some set of rules that would 
minimize its impact.  
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